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From Odious Debt to Odious Finance: Avoiding
the Externalities of a Functional Odious
Debt Doctrine
Christiana Ochoa*
The odious debt doctrine, which holds that in some cases, successor governments should not be responsible
for the debts incurred by previous despotic rule, has limped along in the legal imagination for over a
hundred years. Recently, however, legal theorists and practitioners have attempted to define the contours of
this controversial concept. This article investigates the contents of the odious debt doctrine to query what
characteristics make debt odious rather than simply onerous. It then argues that there may be little distinc-
tion between those characteristics as they apply to debt and as they apply to other types of transnational
financial obligations and financing arrangements that despots may adopt. Finally, the article posits that
if there is, in fact, little distinction, there may be valuable lessons to be learned from the odious debt
doctrine for application to other types of transnational financing arrangements, and proposes that a
broader “odious finance” doctrine is the better approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
A vibrant discourse over sovereign debt forgiveness and cancellation has
emerged in recent years as nongovernmental, governmental, and interna-
tional entities assess the justice of onerous debt levels. Among the facets of
this discussion is a newly emerging elucidation of what has been termed the
odious debt doctrine.
The odious debt doctrine follows from the normative principle that the
debt despots incur should not form a continuing obligation for states emerg-
ing from the grips of a despotic government, at least to the extent that the
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debt did not benefit the population that existed under the prior regime.1
This article does not take issue with this normative position.
Rather, this article identifies a key problem with the application of the
odious debt doctrine. In particular, it argues that the odious debt doctrine,
if implemented alone, would result in unintended consequences because it
would create incentives for dictators to search for funds from sources that
may harm the economic resources, natural environment, and population at
least as much as debt would. Given the odious debt doctrine’s moral impera-
tives and normative goals, it seems unreasonable to develop a functional
odious debt doctrine that will give despots cognizable incentives to make
yet more use of these (potentially more harmful) methods of financing their
regimes.
A more comprehensive view must be taken of the financing mechanisms
utilized by despotic governments, such that odious debt is not viewed as so
unique as to create doctrines around itself that lead to unanticipated results
that might be more detrimental than a world without the odious debt doc-
trine. This article proposes an odious finance doctrine that considers a vari-
ety of financing mechanisms in use by despotic governments and captures
other transactions despots use to finance their regimes.
Both the odious debt doctrine and the proposed odious finance doctrine
contribute significantly to the burgeoning efforts toward, and popular sensi-
bility regarding, corporate social responsibility and, more broadly, regarding
the externalized social and environmental costs of our global economic sys-
tem. This article argues that the odious finance doctrine will be significantly
more beneficial than the odious debt doctrine to close the legal and regula-
tory gaps with respect to human rights violations, corruption, and environ-
mental harms that are perpetrated or perpetuated in connection with
despots.
In establishing an argument for expanding the scope of the odious debt
doctrine, the article will proceed as follows: In Part II, the odious debt doc-
trine—including its historical origins, recent and current wellsprings, and
contemporary academic literature on the subject—will be discussed at some
length. This Part demonstrates that current academic debates have focused
too exclusively on despotic government debt. Part III discusses two interna-
tional norms governing government succession: the doctrine on the continu-
ation of commercial obligations and the doctrine regarding compensation
for expropriation. Under these doctrines the obligations incurred by one re-
gime are binding on its successor. Odious debt—a doctrine of forgiveness—
operates as an exception to this general rule, as would the odious finance
doctrine proposed herein.
Part IV presents two detailed examples of alternative sources of financing
that despotic governments may utilize. Rather than providing an exhaustive
1. For a fuller discussion of the contours of the odious debt doctrine, see infra Part V.
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catalogue of the various means by which dictators may raise funds, this Part
aims to provoke the reader into thinking about the availability of other
sources of funding. Part IV then argues that, in some cases, these alternative
sources of financing may be seen as more harmful than loans to the long-
term interests of the emerging state. The point of this argument is not to
diminish the significant harms that may be bestowed on a successor govern-
ment and its population by high debt levels. Rather, the goal is to explore
the likelihood that some harms wrought by non-debt financing may be
worse than those created by debt. Primarily, the article attempts to achieve
this goal by way of an exposition of real cases that illustrate this proposition.
This exposition does not undermine the utility of the conceptual tools of-
fered by the odious debt doctrine. Rather, it probes whether the concept of
odiousness can be applied to transactions other than loans.
Part V provides the contours of an odious finance doctrine, primarily by
examining the characteristics of the odious debt doctrine. Central to the
application of the doctrine is the categorization of certain debts as “odious”
and therefore subject to cancellation. It then asks whether other types of
despotic financing might be remedied or deterred by expanding application
of the odious debt doctrine to include other transactions despots employ to
finance their regimes, thereby giving rise to an odious finance doctrine.
Part VI contextualizes the odious finance doctrine by assessing the limita-
tions on the application of the doctrine and suggesting some practical appli-
cations of odious finance that transcend the bounds of odious debt.
II. THE ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE
A. Historical Origins and Development
The odious debt doctrine has received a heightened level of attention in
recent years, the most recent wave of which started with the U.S. govern-
ment’s search for mechanisms for handling and disposing of some portions
of Iraq’s outstanding debt.2 The debates surrounding third-world debt for-
giveness have also contributed to the increased attention scholars have re-
cently paid to this doctrine.3 Before turning to these new contributions,
however, it is useful to explore the historical development of this relatively
unknown doctrine.
The idea that a population should not to be burdened by the debts of a
despot has been in circulation for over two millennia.4 Aristotle wrote that
in the event that “a democracy tak[es] the place of an oligarchy or despotism
2. For further discussion of the role that Iraq’s debt played in reviving the odious debt doctrine, see
infra Part II.B.1–2.
3. For a discussion of the role of the odious debt doctrine in the wider debt forgiveness discourse, see
infra Part II.
4. Tai-Heng Cheng, Renegotiating the Odious Debt Doctrine, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming
2007) [hereinafter Cheng, Odious Debt Doctrine].
\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-1\HLI103.txt unknown Seq: 4 26-DEC-07 12:44
112 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 49
. . . persons refuse either to meet the contracts in hand on the ground that it
was not the State, but the despot who entered upon them, or to perform any
similar obligation . . . .”5
The contemporary norm that the debts of states and governments pass to
their successors evolved from early developments in international law.6 The
present rule does not typically recognize that debts can be broken into a
number of categories.7 Buchheit, Gulati, and Thompson have offered the
terminology of “virtuous” and “profligate” debts,8 or debts that will “bene-
fit the people expected to repay the debt” (virtuous debts) and those that
will not (profligate debts).9
Virtuous debts include loans used for the purpose of building necessary
and sustainable infrastructure projects, loans used to finance military activi-
ties that are supported by the state’s populace or which protect the state
against aggression, or loans that facilitate the creation of new economic sec-
tors or the re-invigoration of the entire economy through government-spon-
sored spending programs.10
Profligate debts, on the other hand, are more questionable on economic or
moral grounds, and, as Buchheit, Gulati, and Thompson have defined them,
they “convey little or no benefit to the people expected to repay those
debts.”11 Exceptions to the rule that sovereign debts are passed to successors
are appropriately located under the category of profligate debts.
5. ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS 162 (W.E. Bolland trans., Longmans, Green & Co. 1877).
6. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 221–22, 229–30 (J. Morrice trans., London
1715), cited in TAI-HENG CHENG, STATE SUCCESSION AND COMMERCIAL OBLIGATIONS 13–14 (2006)
[hereinafter CHENG, STATE SUCCESSION]; ARTHUR KEITH, THE THEORY OF STATE SUCCESSION 2–3
(1907).
7. For a more complete description of this taxonomy, see, for example, Lee C. Buchheit et al., The
Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1208–20 (2007).
8. Id. at 1210–20. The categorization of debts into “virtuous” and “profligate” is helpful in analyz-
ing the various types of debt that might be undesirable and perhaps voidable under a variety of legal
theories. Odious debt is just one type of profligate debt.
9. Id. at 1211–12.
10. Id. at 1210–11. Readers should note that in many cases, it will be difficult to distinguish between
virtuous and profligate purposes. For example, while some might demand that an infrastructure project
be both necessary and sustainable, others might only be willing to deem defensive military activity a
virtuous use of debt financing. These debates fall outside the scope of this article, as the odious debt
doctrine will only correctly address those cases that fall clearly into the non-virtuous category.
11. Id. at 1212. Buchheit, Gulati, and Thompson have focused their attention on the intergenera-
tional tension of sovereign debt, which, under current legal doctrine, survives governments (and often
states) and passes to their successors and the future generations thereof. The text of the Buchheit article is
at times unclear about the definition the authors are attaching to “intergenerational tension.” At times,
they appear concerned about the populations of “successor governments and states,” as they should
rightly be. Id. at 1210. At other times, they seem concerned only with “a later generation of citizens.”
Id. at 1212. It should be made clear that even the population living at the time the debt was incurred
and spent may not have benefited in any way from the sovereign’s borrowing. In this way, the use of the
concept of intergenerational tension as the pivot between profligate and virtuous debts can at times be
confusing. Their simpler definition of profligate debts is the better one and applies to borrowings that
“convey little or no benefit to the people expected to repay those debts.” Id.
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Various authors have set forth three possible exceptions to the standard
rule that the debts of a government pass to its successor.12 Those exceptions
include (1) war debts, (2) regime debts or hostile debt, and (3) odious
debt.13 Others have consolidated these exceptions, classifying war debts and
hostile debts as two subcategories of odious debt.14 A brief look at the doc-
trines of war debts and regime debts—each an important predecessor to the
odious debt doctrine—will thus help to explain the origins of the modern
understanding of odious debt.
Commentators typically trace the hostile debt exception to the standard
rule that debts must be repaid to the end of the Spanish-American War.15
At the end of the war, the Spanish government argued that in accordance
with international law the United States, as the holder of Cuba’s sover-
eignty, should repay Cuba’s debts.16 The United States, on the other hand,
took the position that Cuba’s debts would not be repaid. The United States
contended that Cuba incurred the majority of its debts (1) for purposes that
were hostile to Cuba’s ultimate independence, (2) without consent of the
Cuban people, and (3) in order to finance programs intended to help ensure
that Cuba would remain a Spanish territory.17 The loans, for example, were
used to quell Cuban insurrection against Spain.18 The United States further
argued that the lenders knew their funds would be used for this purpose and
must have known the inherent risks of non-repayment when lending for
such purposes.19
12. For a discussion of this doctrine, often referred to as the continuity doctrine or the universal
succession doctrine, see infra Part III.
13. Buchheit, supra note 7, at 1212–20. R
14. See Cheng, Odious Debt Doctrine, supra note 4, at 13–16. This is consistent with O’Connell’s view of R
the composition of the odious debt doctrine. See D.P. O’CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION
187–91 (1956) [hereinafter O’CONNELL, LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION].
15. Buchheit, supra note 7, at 1214–15. R
16. PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION AND THE THIRD WORLD’S ENVI-
RONMENTAL LEGACY 163 (1991) [hereinafter ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS].
17. O’CONNELL, LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 14, at 188–89. R
18. Id. at 188.
19. Id. Readers should note that the doctrine of hostile debts, like the doctrine of odious debt, has a
spotty history. As O’Connell notes, the arguments made by the United States after the Spanish-American
War were thereafter attempted in the course of drafting the treaties of Versailles and St.-Germain in
1919. The arguments were successful in excusing Poland from its debts but not ultimately successful in
excusing Czechoslovakia from the wartime and pre-war debts incurred by the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
See also Memorandum of American Peace Commission, Paris, Oct. 14, 1889, S. Doc. No. 62-55, pt. 2 at
48–50 (1899), reprinted in JOHN BASSETT MOORE, MOORE’S DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 97,
358–59 (John Bassett Moore ed., 1906), stating:
From the moral point of view, the proposal to impose [these debts] upon Cuba is . . . untena-
ble. If, as is sometimes asserted, the struggles for Cuban independence have been carried on
and supported by a minority of the people of the island, to impose upon the inhabitants as a
whole the cost of suppressing the insurrections would be to punish the many for the deeds of
the few. If, on the other hand, those struggles have, as the American Commissioners maintain,
represented the hopes and aspirations of the body of the Cuban people, to crush the inhabitants
by a burden created by Spain in the effort to oppose their independence would be even more
unjust.
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War debts act as another potential exception to the standard rule. The
war debt exception asserts that “creditors who lend money for the purpose of
carrying on a war, or when a war is ‘notoriously imminent,’ are investing in
a doubtful security.”20 The test for war debts is slightly different than that
for hostile debts but, as in the hostile debt context, turns in part on the
lenders’ implied or actual knowledge that they may not be repaid for the
loans they have extended. O’Connell states that two instances were founda-
tional in shaping this doctrine: the annexation of the Boer Republics in
1900 during the course of the Boer War and the World War I peace treaties
(the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Saint-Germain) of 1919.21 In both
instances, parties argued that the debt incurred by the vanquished enemy
government in fighting against the ultimate victor would not be assumed
by the victor or successor government.22
In addition, Buchheit, Gulati, and Thompson have accurately reminded
us that the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution also includes a
war debt exception with respect to the debts the Confederate States incurred
to finance their rebellion.23 The Fourteenth Amendment voided these debts
by stating that:
[N]either the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and
void.24
Finally, the origins of the odious debt doctrine are often traced to an
arbitration in 1923 between Costa Rica and Great Britain, typically referred
to as the Tinoco Arbitration, over which William Howard Taft presided as
sole arbitrator.25 Costa Rica had been ruled by a dictator, Federico Tinoco,
who entered into a number of agreements with private entities.26 A number
of those contracts served to benefit Tinoco or his family members personally.
After Tinoco retired and left office, a Costa Rican domestic law called the
Law of Nullities No. 41 repudiated all of these contracts.27 Examples of such
ALEXANDER N. SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES E´TATS SUR LEURS DETTES PUBLIQUES ET
AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIE`RES [THE EFFECTS OF STATE TRANSFORMATIONS ON THEIR PUBLIC DEBTS
AND OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS] 159 (1927).
20. O’CONNELL, LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 14, at 189. R
21. Id. at 190–91.
22. Id.
23. Buchheit, supra note 7, at 1213 n.29. R
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
25. William Howard Taft was serving at the time as the tenth Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court.
26. Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica, 1 R.I.A.A. 369 (1923), reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT’L L. 147 (1924) [herein-
after Tinoco]. An electronic synopsis of this arbitration is also available. See Kurt Taylor Gaubatz and
Kathleen Kane, Abridgment and Notes, The Tinoco Arbitration: Arbitration Between Great Britain and
Costa Rica, http://www.gwu.edu/~jaysmith/Tinoco.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
27. Tinoco, supra note 26, at 148. R
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contracts notably included a concession contract made with the Central
Costa Rica Petroleum Company, a British firm, pursuant to which the com-
pany was granted the right to “explore for and exploit oil deposits in Costa
Rica”28 and loans provided directly to Tinoco by the Royal Bank of Canada,
purportedly for government expenses, but with full knowledge by the Bank
that these loans were destined for Tinoco’s personal use upon his departure
from Costa Rica.29 Loans were also made directly to Tinoco’s brother for
payment of his future salary.30 Taft stopped short of contravening the stan-
dard rule of government succession to sovereign debts.31 However, he also
upheld the Costa Rican Law of Nullities, writing:
The whole transaction here was full of irregularities . . . . It must make
out its case of actual furnishing of money for [the government’s] legiti-
mate use. It has not done so. The bank knew that this money was to be
used by the retiring president, F. Tinoco, for his personal support after
he had taken refuge in a foreign country. It could not hold his own
government [responsible] for the money paid to him for this purpose.
The case of the money paid to the brother . . . is much the same.32
Taft employed a different test to uphold the Law of Nullities in the Ti-
noco Arbitration than what had been used previously in the hostile debt or
war debt context. Here, there was no colonial power imposing a debt on a
newly liberated state as in the hostile debt context, nor were there victors or
vanquished parties as one would find in the war debt scenario. However,
there were similarities. The people of Costa Rica did not benefit from the
loans; rather, the loans were “so closely connected with this payment for
obviously personal and unlawful uses of the Tinoco brothers”33 that the
bank could not make a rightful claim that the loans were made “for any
legitimate governmental uses of the Tinoco government.”34 For Taft, it was
also significant that the lenders knew that the loans would not be used to
benefit Costa Rica or its people.35
28. Id. at 149. Notable for the central thesis of this article, the Law of Nullities cancelled all of these
contracts, and the arbitration addressed both the loans and the concession agreement. Discussions regard-
ing the odious debt doctrine largely ignore the concession portions of this arbitration and focus exclu-
sively on the loans.
29. Id. at 168.
30. Id.
31. ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS, supra note 16, at 167–68; Tinoco, supra note 26, at 375–99. R
32. Tinoco, supra note 26, at 394. R
33. Id.
34. Id. Robert Howse has compiled a concise history of the odious debt doctrine that includes addi-
tional instances where the doctrine was at issue. See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], The Concept
of Odious Debt in Public International Law, UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2007/4 (July 2007) (prepared by Robert
Howse) [hereinafter Howse], available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp185_en.pdf.
35. Howse, supra note 34. R
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Thus, when Alexander Sack identified the contours of an emergent odious
debt doctrine in 1927, he by no means did so out of whole cloth.36 Still,
Sack coined the term “dettes odieuses.”37 He wrote:
If a despotic power incurs a debt not for the needs or in the interests
of the State, but to strengthen its despotic regime, to repress the popu-
lation that fights against it, etc., this debt is odious for the population
of all the State.
This debt is not an obligation for the nation; it is a regime’s debt, a
personal debt of the power that has incurred it, consequently it falls
with the fall of this power.
The reason these “odious” debts cannot be considered to encumber
the territory of the State, is that such debts do not fulfill one of the
conditions that determine the legality of the debts of the State, that is:
the debts of the State must be incurred and the funds from it employed
for the needs and in the interests of the State.
“Odious” debts, incurred and used for ends which, to the knowledge
of the creditors, are contrary to the interests of the nation, do not com-
prise the latter—in the case that the nation succeeds in getting rid of
the government which incurs them—except to the extent that real ad-
vantages were obtained from these debts. The creditors have commit-
ted a hostile act with regards to the people; they can’t therefore expect
that a nation freed from a despotic power assume the “odious” debts,
which are personal debts of that power.38
Thus, in order for a debt to be classified as “odious” under Sack’s formu-
lation, the debt must be (1) incurred by a despotic power;39 (2) used for
36. In fact, as Buchheit et al. have noted, commentators prior to Sack had taken note of the perils of
lending to countries in which a regime change could result in the loans being “portrayed as hostile to the
citizens of that country, personal to a departing dictator, or otherwise lacking the consent of the people
ultimately bound to repay the loans.” Buchheit, supra note 7, at 1217–18 (citing Charles H. Hyde, The R
Negotiation of External Loans with Foreign Governments, 16 AM. J. INT’L L. 523, 531 (1922) and John
Fischer Williams, International Law and International Financial Obligation Arising from Contract, in 2 BIB-
LIOTHECA VISSERIANA DISSERTATIONVM IVS INTERNATIONALE ILLVSTRANTIVM, vol. II, at 54–55 (1924)).
37. SACK, supra note 19, at 157–84. R
38. ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS, supra note 16, at 165 (citing SACK, supra note 19, at 157). R
39. SACK, supra note 19, at 157–58. Despotism usually refers to a form of government where a single R
authority exercises absolute power. This article mirrors the majority of the literature on odious debt,
however, in that it is not strict in its use of the term “despot” and, like the odious debt literature, uses
other, largely synonymous terms such as “tyrant” and “totalitarian,” or “dictator” and “dictatorship.”
See, e.g., Buchheit, supra note 7, at 24 (noting that “the most important thing is to be able to spot the R
despot, the dictator, the tyrant—in other words the odious regime” but offering no definition of these
terms). This is perhaps as it should be, given the mutable and unique nature of each such government.
This may well be a case where providing a precise definition may be difficult or impossible and not
beneficial. Some authors have argued that a regime should be labeled “odious” if it systematically re-
presses its population or loots the nation’s resources and wealth. This article identifies a variety of re-
gimes that could be classified as despotic. A precise determination of whether they would fit the
definition of “despotic regimes” by some normative standard is beyond the scope of this article. None-
theless, the fact that a regime possesses certain despotic characteristics may not render it despotic. For
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purposes that do not further the needs or interests of the state;40 and (3) the
creditor must have known that the loans would be used for purposes con-
trary to the interests of the nation.41
It has been argued that, in addition to the three elements Sack sets out,
there is or should be a fourth: that the debt must have been incurred with-
out the consent of the state’s people.42 Sack was aware of the possibility of
this fourth element and included it in his exposition of odious debt. In
reference to the Cuban debt discussed previously herein, Sack noted that
John Bassett Moore had written, “The burden of the so called ‘Cuban debt,’
imposed upon the people of Cuba without their consent and by force of
arms, was one of the principal wrongs for the termination of which the
struggles for Cuban independence were undertaken.”43
Regardless of whether a three-prong or four-prong test is employed, it
would be a mistake to state that the odious debt doctrine is accepted under
international law. States have not explicitly bound themselves to the princi-
ples of the odious debt doctrine and there is no odious debt treaty or conven-
tion encapsulating this doctrine. Similarly, there is not at this time a
plausible argument that sufficient state practice accompanied by opinio juris
has made the odious debt doctrine a matter of international custom.44
example, a despotic regime is likely to be corrupt, but it is not the case that all corrupt regimes are
despotic.
40. ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS, supra note 16, at 165 (citing SACK, supra note 19, at 157). R
41. Id.
42. There is some controversy over this fourth criterion. Buchheit, Gulati, and Thompson, for exam-
ple, fold the fourth criterion into the requirement that a despot incur the debt. For them, this implies
that the people did not approve the incurrence of the debt. Buchheit, supra note 7, at 1218 n.52. Cheng, R
on the other hand, has unearthed at least four scholars who have set out this fourth requirement: John
Bassett Moore in 1906, D.P. O’Connell in 1956, Ashfaq Khalfan in 2003, and Anupam Chander in
2004. See Cheng, Odious Debt Doctrine, supra note 4, at 13–14 (citing MOORE, supra note 19, at 359); R
O’CONNELL, supra note 14, at 188; Christopher G. Paulus, “Odious Debts” vs. Debt Trap: A Realistic Help?, R
31 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 83, 85 (2005); Anupam Chander, Odious Securitization, 53 EMORY L.J. 923, 924
(2004).
43. SACK, supra note 19, at 159 (citing MOORE, supra note 19, at 359). R
44. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice sets out the sources of international
law as follows:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes
as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting States;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. The Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States defines customary international law slightly differently
from article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute as the law that “results from a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987). It should be noted that this doctrine might be an
example of the type of customary law that may be affected by the inclusion of individuals in the forma-
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B. Recent Revival of the Odious Debt Doctrine
The doctrine currently stands as a useful theory and argument in particu-
lar instances of debt reduction or forgiveness. Recently, the theory has as-
sisted lawyers and policymakers in considering two pressing goals:
eliminating third-world debt45 and reducing the overwhelming debt of
Iraq.46 The doctrine has proved to be a useful conceptual tool in these con-
texts, and as a result, the idea of odious debt has resurfaced and has been the
subject of recent scholarship, especially during 2007.47 This subpart pro-
vides a brief overview of a sampling of this scholarly attention.
The purpose of this overview is twofold. First, it outlines some of the
questions and approaches surrounding the theory of odious debts. The sec-
ond is more important to the ultimate objectives of this article: illustrating
and challenging two widespread assumptions about debt. In recent scholar-
ship devoted to the idea of odious debts and the implications of a functional
odious debt doctrine, there appears to be a common assumption that debt is
not only the first and best financing option for states but also that, in the
face of rising costs of lending, borrowers will either pay more for loans or
will be forced to live without whatever finances they were hoping to attain
through borrowing. A second shared assumption appears to be that loans are
the only type of commercial obligation or means of financing a despotic
government that might burden successor governments, successor states, and
tion of customary international law, a proposal by the present author. See Christiana Ochoa, The Individ-
ual and Customary International Law Formation, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119 (2007).
45. See, e.g., JOHN SMITH, THIRD WORLD DEBT: RELIEF OR CREDIT CRUNCH? (2000), http://www.
cseweb.org.uk/downloads/smith.pdf. In connection with the debates on third-world debt cancellation,
the odious debt doctrine is just one of many tools. The applicability in some countries would be obvious,
as the leaders of many developing countries have been despots and have borrowed for purposes that would
meet the criteria to be termed odious.
46. See, e.g., Patricia Adams, Iraq’s Odious Debts, Policy Analysis No. 526, Sept. 28, 2004, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa526.pdf [hereinafter Adams, Iraq’s Odious Debts]; G8 RESEARCH GROUP,
DEBT RELIEF: IRAQ, INTERIM COMPLIANCE REPORT, Feb. 9, 2006, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evalua-
tions/2005compliance_interim/2005-13_g8-i-comp_iraq.pdf. As of 2004, Iraq’s debt was estimated to
be approximately $120 billion. A significant portion of this debt would be characterized as “odious” by
application of the odious debt doctrine. As a result, the United States has led an effort to see Iraq’s debts
reduced. Id. The obvious applicability of the odious debt doctrine to this situation and its potential
utility led to a good deal of discussion on the topic. See also Jubilee Iraq, Odious Debt, http://
www.jubileeiraq.org/odiousdebt.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2007); William F. Buckley, Jr., Odious Activi-
ties: Should Iraqi Debt Be Repaid To Russia and France?, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Oct. 7, 2003, http://www.
nationalreview.com/buckley/buckley200310071228.asp.
47. In January 2007, Duke Law School and its Journal of Law and Contemporary Problems hosted a
conference titled Odious Debts and State Corruption. In February 2007, the University of North Carolina
School of Law and the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation hosted
Odious Debt: Exploring the Outer Limits of Sovereign Debt. The Duke conference was called the “first-ever
conference on odious debt, law and economics,” and the pair of conferences are seen in the community of
advocates for an odious debt doctrine as “an unprecedented run of public debate on the issue of odious
debts . . . .” Odious Debts Online, Legal Scholars Hold Another Public Debate on Odious Debt, Feb. 7, 2007,
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=odo_news&NewsID=2837.
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their people and impede their ability to form and fund a fully functioning
government.48
1. The Iraq Context
When the United States first occupied Iraq, the Iraqi national debt was
estimated to be approximately $120 billion.49 This debt stood as a tremen-
dous obstacle to the reconstruction and redevelopment of Iraq.50 As a result,
a number of scholars and debt-reduction advocates looked to the odious debt
doctrine as a tool for reducing the country’s debt. However, the literature on
odious debt and immediately related topics was sparse at that time.51
Starting in late 2003, soon after President Bush appointed former Secre-
tary of State James Baker as his emissary regarding the Iraqi debt, this
changed significantly. Commentators published a number of articles and
reports on Iraq’s debt situation and many proposed potential solutions or
ameliorants. Patricia Adams, for example, published a policy paper that de-
scribed the odious debt doctrine and recommended that the Iraqi people not
allow their debt to be restructured through the channels and efforts put
forth by the United States, which favored a debt reduction and rescheduling
by the Paris Club52 and rejected debt forgiveness on the basis of any moral
or quasi-legal imperatives.53 She proposed that the Iraqi people should take
48. The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts
of 1983, defines state debt as “any financial obligation of a predecessor State arising in conformity with
international law towards another State, an international organization or any other subject of interna-
tional law.” Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.117.14 (Apr. 8, 1983).
49. MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IRAQ: PARIS CLUB DEBT RELIEF, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS (2005), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/44019.pdf (noting that of the $120 bil-
lion national debt, approximately $40 billion was owed to Paris Club members ($21 billion in principal
and $19 billion interest), $60–$65 billion was owed to non-Paris Club governments (mainly in the
Persian Gulf), and $15 billion was owed to commercial creditors).
50. See Martin Crutsinger, World Bank Calls on Rich Countries to Forgive Two-Thirds of Iraq’s Debt,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 29, 2003.
51. ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS, supra note 16; Michael Kremer & Seema Jayachandran, Odious Debt, R
Brookings Institution Policy Brief No. 103 (July 2002), http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/
pb103.htm (providing two of the very few examples of academic treatment of the issue). For a fairly
comprehensive bibliography of this work, see generally the Odious Debts webpage at http://
www.odiousdebts.org, which includes a section on Key Reports on Odious Debts, housing a number of the
reports produced by civil society and academics, http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?
DSP=titles&SubID=519 (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). The majority of other work existing at the time
came out of the debt-reduction movement and has provided a very good foundation for later scholarly
work in the field. For example, Jubilee Iraq, a nongovernmental organization dedicated to the reduction
of Iraqi debt and of its odious debt in particular, was formed in March 2003 and operates as a clearing-
house for information about the status of financial claims against Iraq. Jubilee Iraq was inspired, at least
partially, by the larger Jubilee movement, which seeks reduction and forgiveness of sovereign debt of less
developed countries. Their web addresses are, respectively, http://www.jubileeiraq.org and http://
www.jubileeresearch.org (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
52. The Paris Club is an informal group of the world’s nineteen major creditor countries. This group
works together on occasion to reduce or reschedule developing country debts. The Paris Club, http://
www.clubdeparis.org (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
53. See generally Adams, Iraq’s Odious Debts, supra note 46. R
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advantage of the odious debt doctrine and require lenders to prove the legit-
imacy of their loans and their resultant claims. Under her proposal, claims
could be processed through an arbitral tribunal that would investigate the
legitimacy of each contested loan.54
During this period, the Council on Foreign Relations also published a
report on Iraq’s debt. The report included a brief but fairly complete over-
view of the debt, the U.S. plan for reducing the debt, and the applicability
of the odious debt doctrine to the situation.55 Soon after this report was
published, the Congressional Research Service (CRS)56 focused its attention
on the subject of Iraqi debt.57 The CRS reports, however, did not address
odious debt, even as they focused on the debt relief measures pursued by the
United States and the inconsistencies such measures would create, given that
countries such as “Nigeria, Indonesia, Kenya and Georgia have also recently
emerged from decades of authoritarian and autocratic rule, and are saddled
with extensive government debt, yet receive nowhere near the level of inter-
national exposure that has been given the Iraq situation.”58
Finally, a small handful of legal academic articles and student notes were
published around this time.59
2. The Broader Debt Forgiveness Context
While the United States was wringing its hands over how to reduce Iraq’s
debt, the discussion about third-world debt forgiveness was becoming live-
54. Id. at 13–14.
55. ESTHER PAN, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., IRAQ: THE REGIME’S DEBT (2003), http://www.cfr.org/
publication/7796.
56. The Congressional Research Service is a research group that provides Congress with reports on a
wide variety of politically relevant issues.
57. CRS reports are only occasionally available to the public. As a result, this article does not claim to
provide a comprehensive list of CRS reports on this topic. One such report, however, is MARTIN A.
WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IRAQ: PARIS CLUB DEBT RELIEF, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (2005),
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/44019.pdf.
58. Id. at CRS-5 to CRS-6. Detlev Vagts has compared Iraq’s situation to that of Germany’s under
Hitler. He reminds his readers that in the case of Germany, odious debt was not at issue because Ger-
many had not incurred any contractual indebtedness under Hitler’s rule. He states, seemingly casually,
that this is one of the differences between the German and Iraqi debt problems, but otherwise does not
and has not addressed the question of odious debt. Detlev F. Vagts, Sovereign Bankruptcy: In Re Germany
(1953), In Re Iraq (2004), 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 302, 303 (2004).
59. See Kevin H. Anderson, International Law and State Succession: A Solution to the Iraqi Debt Crisis?
2005 UTAH L. REV. 401 (2005) (raising the possibility that Iraq could be a good location in which to
exercise the odious debt doctrine); Anna Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6
CHI. J. INT’L L. 391 (2005) (arguing that the Argentine debt restructuring could prove that even massive
and potentially odious debt may be more efficiently reduced through methods other than the application
of the odious debt doctrine); Darius Adam Marzec, The New Iraq: Resolving Public and Private Obligations
Incurred Under Saddam Hussein’s Rule in the Context of International Arbitration, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 163 (2005) (arguing for the creation of an arbitration tribunal in Iraq regarding Hussein-era debt
and contractual obligations); Paulus, supra note 42 (providing an overview of the odious debt doctrine); R
Volinka Reina, Iraq’s Delictual and Contractual Liabilities: Would Politics or International Law Provide for
Better Resolution of Successor State Responsibility?, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 583, 584 (2004) (arguing that
politics is more apt than law to address Iraq’s liabilities).
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lier.60 Much of this discussion took place in the context of two debt-reduc-
tion initiatives created by the World Bank and IMF: the Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (“HIPC”) Initiative, which was introduced in 1996 to act as
a comprehensive framework for debt relief, and the Multilateral Debt Relief
Initiative (“MDRI”), which “allows for 100 percent relief on eligible debts
by three multilateral institutions—the IMF, the International Development
Association (“IDA”) of the World Bank, and the African Development
Fund (“AfDF”)—for countries completing the HIPC Initiative process.”61
In many cases, the countries that stood to benefit from debt forgiveness
were new democracies that had only recently emerged from dictatorships62
and were fraught with corruption and graft.63 Some commentators have ac-
cordingly begun to favor the inclusion of the odious debt doctrine in the
broader debt forgiveness debate.64
There are essentially two approaches in this literature. The first argues
that the HIPC is not inclusive enough and that a comprehensive considera-
tion of countries with meritorious claims for debt relief would include not
only the most indebted and poorest countries of the world but also those
countries servicing debt that was incurred by means satisfying the elements
of the odious debt doctrine. Michael Kremer and Seema Jayachandran have
noted that several other countries should have been granted debt relief in
connection with the HIPC. Additionally, several countries that are not on
the HIPC list of debt relief candidates have “a plausible claim that their
debts are illegitimate . . . .”65
The second approach notes the attention the odious debt doctrine received
in the Iraq context and argues that the conceptualization of illegitimate debt
in Iraq is similarly applicable to many other countries and situations.66
60. Jeffrey Sachs has done much to make this topic more accessible to the public. See, e.g., Jeffrey
Sachs, The Development Challenge, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 78 (2005).
61. International Monetary Fund, Factsheet: Debt Relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country
(HIPC) Initiative, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
62. Examples include Nigeria, Indonesia, and Kenya.
63. The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2007 ranks Nigeria, Kenya, and
Indonesia among the most corrupt countries in the world. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEP-
TION INDEX 2007, http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007.
64. The most direct treatment of this suggestion appeared in a 2004 student note. See Emily F.
Mancina, Note, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God: Resurrecting the Odious Debt Doctrine in International
Law, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1239 (2004); see also Nsongurua Undombana, The Summer Has Ended
and We are Not Saved! Towards a Transformative Agenda for Africa’s Development, 7 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 5
(2005).
65. Kremer & Jayachandran, supra note 51; see, e.g., Charles Mutasa, Politics of the Millennium Develop- R
ment Goals in Africa: Is Global Partnership Really Working, 6 SUST. DEV. L. & POL’Y 25 (2005–06); see also
CENTRO DE DERECHOS ECONO´MICOS Y SOCIALES, UPHEAVAL IN THE BACK YARD: ILLEGITIMATE DEBTS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CASE OF ECUADOR-NORWAY (2002), available at http://www.oid-ido.org/
IMG/pdf/Illegitimate_Debts_and_Human_Rights.pdf.
66. See, e.g., Africa Action, Africa’s Debt & Iraq’s Debt—Washington’s Double Standard, TALKING
POINTS, Apr. 21, 2004, http://www.africaaction.org/newsroom/index.php?op=read&documentid=493&
type=14.
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3. Sovereign Debt, Burdensome Debt, and the Odious Debt Doctrine
The burgeoning odious debt literature has received a good deal of atten-
tion from experts in sovereign debt and lending. Valuable analyses have
been recently written by Anna Gelpern67 and Lee Buchheit,68 both of whom
have significant experience in these areas, and Mechele Dickerson, a bank-
ruptcy expert.69
Tom Ginsburg, Thomas S. Ulen, and Larry Backer have also made valua-
ble contributions to this literature by exploring the problem of the odious
creditor—the creditor who will lend to the worst of regimes for any number
of reasons.70 Omri Ben-Shahar and Mitu Gulati have taken a more nuanced
view of the “odious creditor” concept. They argue that the party best posi-
tioned to prevent accumulation of odious debt is the party who ought to
bear the cost of such debt. At the same time, Ben-Shahar and Gulati make
the important point that populations often do benefit from at least some
portion of debt incurred by despotic regimes. To the extent that this is so,
populations and creditors should share liability on the debt, reflecting the
relative blameworthiness and benefits of each.71
The contributions of these scholars have been invaluable to the develop-
ment of the odious debt doctrine. Nonetheless, they have focused their at-
tention solely on debt to the exclusion of other types of financing and
contracts, perpetuating a blind spot in the odious debt doctrine and its at-
tendant literature and in the wider effort to close the legal and regulatory
gaps with respect to the relationship between economic activity and social
and environmental harms.
67. Gelpern, supra note 59; Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcom- R
ing 2007).
68. Buchheit, supra note 7. R
69. Mechele Dickerson, Insolvency Principles and the Doctrine of Odious Debts: The Missing Link in the
International Human Rights Debate, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007) (evaluating the
odious debt doctrine through the framework provided by the U.S. Bankruptcy Code); see also Charles
Seavey, The Anomalous Lack of an International Bankruptcy Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 499 (2006)
(arguing that there is no international bankruptcy court because the world’s economic powers prefer ad-
hoc and political resolution of debt crises); Kunibert Raffer, Odious, Illegitimate, Illegal or Legal Debts—
What Difference Does it Make for International Chapter 9 Debt Arbitration?, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(forthcoming 2007) (discussing duties of creditors and when and how creditor misbehavior would trigger
damages).
70. Tom Ginsburg & Thomas S. Ulen, Odious Debt, Odious Credit, Economic Development and Democrati-
zation (Univ. of Ill. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. LE07-014, 2007), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=981627 (focusing some attention on the odious creditor and
proposing that international financial institutions establish and fund an insurance scheme to which both
nations and creditors seeking to repudiate debt on the basis of odiousness can appeal); Larry Cata´ Backer,
Odious Debt Wears Two Faces: Systemic Illegitimacy, Problems and Opportunities in Traditional Odious Debt Con-
ceptions in Globalized Economic Regimes, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007) (examining the
illegitimacy of the credit, rather than the debt side of odious debt, looking specifically at the arguments
of Fidel Castro about the “systemic odiousness” of the world’s lending institutions as a basis for
repudiation).
71. Omri Ben-Shahar & Mitu Gulati, Partially Odious Debts?: A Framework for an Optimal Liability
Regime, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007).
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4. The Moral Imperatives of the Odious Debt Doctrine
Finally, the odious debt doctrine has gained the attention of a number of
commentators focused primarily on the moral imperatives and human rights
aspects of the doctrine. The doctrine holds a compelling promise for cancel-
ling the crippling debt burdens of countries recently freed from dictatorial,
corrupt, and odious regimes.72
In addition, some commentators have noted that the doctrine holds the
possibility of acting as a private enforcement mechanism for international
anti-corruption law.73 One example includes a proposal that countries
emerging from corrupt regimes may be excused from the repayment of debt
on “traditional” odious debt principles and, further, that those emerging
from truly abusive regimes would have to be paid restitution by businesses,
banks, and nations that actively and knowingly invested in such a regime.74
There are, of course, other important contributions to the burgeoning
literature on odious debt. One notable example includes Adam Feibleman’s
recent article arguing that sovereigns and creditors could undertake contrac-
tual provisions for the prevention and repudiation of odious debt.75
Despite a strong tendency toward optimism on the part of commentators
regarding the odious debt doctrine, the doctrine and its attendant literature
also has critics. Tai-Heng Cheng argues that the odious debt doctrine fails
to take into account the fact that successions are so fundamentally political
that legal rules have failed to gain any foothold.76 He argues that the only
viable strategy for influencing outcomes is not through tools like the odious
debt doctrine, but rather through a savvy understanding of the international
decision-making process. A similar critique might be applicable to the odi-
ous finance doctrine proposed herein. However, this article acknowledges
that debt forgiveness and considerations about requisite compensation for
expropriation in the case of succession are highly political processes. It fol-
lows, therefore, that the article does not make the ambitious suggestion that
an odious finance doctrine would or should be law, much as this might be
an ideal objective. The odious debt doctrine is not currently a legal doctrine.
Nonetheless, it may operate as a persuasive conceptual tool and argument for
debt forgiveness. Odious finance would similarly operate in the political,
rather than the legal, context, providing regularized, recognized, and legiti-
72. See, e.g., Joseph Hanlon, Defining Illegitimate Debt and Linking Its Cancellation to Economic Justice,
Norwegian Church Aid (2002), available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/Defin-
ingIllegitimateDebt.pdf.
73. Anita Ramasastry, Odious Debt or Odious Payments? Using Anti-Corruption Measures to Prevent Odious
Debt, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 819 (2007).
74. David Gray, Devilry, Complicity and Greed: Transitional Justice and Odious Debt, 71 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007).
75. Adam Feibelman, Contract, Priority and Odious Debt, 85 N.C. L. REV. 727 (2007); see also Cheng,
Odious Debt Doctrine, supra note 4. R
76. See CHENG, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 6. R
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mate arguments for both debt forgiveness and leniency in compensation for
expropriation cases.
Albert Choi and Eric Posner offer criticisms of the odious debt doctrine
on more substantive than procedural grounds. They argue that there is rea-
son for skepticism about a number of the empirical premises made by the
human rights-focused odious debt doctrine optimists.77 Despite the fact that
this article fundamentally disagrees with the ultimate skepticism expressed
by Choi and Posner, it concurs with their observation that “[i]f a dictatorial
regime cannot borrow because of the odious debt doctrine, the regime might
attempt to extract and sell inefficiently large quantities of nonrenewable
natural resources . . . .”78 In addition, Choi and Posner point to the current
problem faced by Western countries in locations such as Sudan and My-
anmar, where China and Russia have undermined Western economic lever-
age over those governments by continuing to trade with and invest in those
countries.79 However, unlike the Choi and Posner critique, which ends its
contribution to the odious debt doctrine discourse in skepticism and criti-
cism, this article attempts to create a framework to avert a particular prob-
lem nestled within the odious debt doctrine.80
Given the relatively recent swell of this literature and the discrete charac-
ter of this doctrine, a large portion of the literature shares several assump-
tions. Among the most important of these shared assumptions for the
purpose of this article is that the only significant financing mechanism for
states is debt and the only kind of contract that can be odious is a lending
contract. These assumptions present inherent perils, all of which arise from
their failure to acknowledge the various other mechanisms states may em-
ploy to raise funds and, in particular, the financing tools corrupt or despotic
leaders may utilize to increase their private coffers. Before turning to a dis-
cussion of these mechanisms in Part IV, Part III will provide a brief over-
view of the existing international law governing successor governments and
states with respect to their financial obligations and transactions.
77. See Albert Choi and Eric Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine (U. Chi. L. & Econ., Olin
Working Paper No. 323, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper.cfm?abstract_id=957346.
In particular, Choi and Posner argue that “because the dictator controls the government, the doctrine
necessarily harms the public if it is to affect the incentives of the dictator.” Id.
78. See id. at 15.
79. See id. at 17. 
80. For further discussion, see infra Part VI. It should be noted that Choi and Posner offer additional
criticisms of the odious debt doctrine, such as the possibility that the public will actually be harmed by
the absence of quasi-public investments, id. at 14, and the possibility that isolating dictators is not
always a viable strategy, id. at 16. They would likely find similar flaws in an odious finance doctrine,
despite the ability of the odious finance doctrine to capture other concerns they express, such as the
likelihood that dictators would turn more heavily to natural resource exploitation. In addition, Choi and
Posner take issue with Jayachandran and Kremer’s focus on loan sanctions to the exclusion of trade
sanctions. This article does not take the position that one type of sanction is preferable to another.
Rather, given the political nature of successions and the treatment successors receive regarding loan
forgiveness and requisite compensation for expropriation, it seems the best approach to regularize and
legitimize various economic methods for discouraging despotism.
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III. UNDERLYING LEGAL DOCTRINES
The odious debt doctrine and the odious finance doctrine proposed herein
may enable governments emerging from a dictatorship to avoid unfair obli-
gations traditionally imposed by international law, namely the international
law doctrines governing the continuing commercial obligations of successor
states and the responsibilities of sovereigns to provide compensation for ex-
propriations of property.81
A. Continuity of Commercial Obligations
History contains a plentiful catalog of state and government successions,
each of them particular and peculiar in their own ways: peaceable or forceful;
anticipated or not; welcomed or dreaded. These, of course, are not legal clas-
sifications. Under international law, the two main operative categories in
succession doctrine are state succession and government succession.82 This
distinction has been criticized as failing to meet the policy needs of a global
economy.83
National governments founder or run their terms on a regular basis.
When they do, they are normally followed by successor governments, either
friendly or antagonistic to their predecessors. In states where succession is
regularized by constitutional mandate,84 statute,85 or custom,86 government
succession may be largely predictable or at least follow predictable patterns.
Unstable regimes, on the other hand, may be toppled unpredictably. In ei-
ther scenario, classical doctrine on government succession holds that the
commercial obligations of the predecessor government will be passed along
to the successor.
81. Readers should also note that there is legal doctrine relating succession to state contracts. For a
discussion of the contract question, see infra Part VI. Unlike in the areas of continuity of commercial
obligations and compensation for expropriation, the odious finance doctrine would be largely consistent
with the doctrine on succession to contracts and would therefore not act as an exception to that doctrine.
82. This distinction has been criticized as irrelevant in the modern context of globalization. See, e.g.,
CHENG, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 6, at 2–4. R
83. Id. at 4. This article adopts this view. References to state or government succession alone should
be read to include both state and government successions.
84. The Constitution of the United States of America serves as a fine example. See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 4 (addressing the election of Senators and Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (addressing
succession to the presidency); U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3 (addressing succession in the event the
President-elect or Vice President-elect is ineligible or unable to serve); U.S. CONST. amend. XXV (ad-
dressing voluntary and involuntary succession to the presidency and vice-presidency).
85. See, e.g., 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2000) (designating a long line of succession to the presidency).
86. The United Arab Emirates serves as a good example of a hybrid between constitutional provisions
and custom regarding succession. Although its constitution contains detailed provisions regarding suc-
cession to the presidency, when the only president in the history of that country died, the successor was
determined according to familial and political considerations reminiscent of more customary societies. See
PROVISIONAL CONST. OF THE U.A.E. art. 51–53 (containing the rules of presidential election and succes-
sion); see also Strategic Forecasting, Inc., United Arab Emirates: The Question of Succession (Oct. 17,
2004), http://www.tunezine.com/breve.php3?id_breve=682 (discussing the likely successors to the then-
president, who was rumored to be living his final days).
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The rules regarding state and government succession, the legal signifi-
cance of succession and the obligations of successors to fulfill the obligations
of their predecessors, are noted for their complexity, inaccuracies and lack of
clarity87 and, especially in the case of state succession, may be so full with
examples in which the doctrine was supplemented with other considerations
and case-by-case treatment that they look more like a slate of potential po-
litical considerations than legal doctrines.88 Nonetheless, this Part will
briefly discuss two relevant doctrines for successor governments, both of
which have a well-developed history and literature.
State and government succession to commercial obligations is typically
governed by the rules of universal succession,89 which state that successor
states and governments succeed not only to the responsibilities of govern-
ance and assets of a territory, but also to their debts and other commercial
obligations.
The odious debt doctrine exists as a potential exception to the universal
succession doctrine since it holds out the possibility that successors would
not bear the debt burdens incurred by their predecessors in the event that
the previous regime was sufficiently repressive and that the benefits of the
debt did not benefit the population, together with other potential require-
ments.90 The odious finance doctrine proposed herein would expand the con-
cept of odiousness and would continue to provide an exception to this
doctrine.
B. Compensation for Expropriation
The odious finance doctrine proposed in this article rests on the idea that
parties that invest in a despotic regime may be benefiting the despotic re-
gime rather than the people of that state. To the extent that investors have
reason to know this would be the case, the benefits of the standard compen-
sation for expropriation doctrine ought not to provide them with cover for
the political risks they take on in a given foreign investment venture.
87. See W. Michael Reisman, Foreword to TAI-HENG CHENG, STATE SUCCESSION AND COMMERCIAL
OBLIGATIONS (2006); CHENG, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 6, at 26, 37. R
88. For further discussion of the political nature of the odious debt doctrine and the odious finance
doctrine, see supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. R
89. The universal succession theory, or the theory of continuity of obligations, has its roots in Roman
law. However, its position as the prevailing doctrine has not been constant. In fact, a wide range of
theories of commercial obligation upon succession has existed and has spanned the extremes from the
tabula rasa (clean slate) theory, which held that no obligations pass to a successor, to the universal
succession theory, which holds that all obligations pass to successors. As Cheng notes, neither of these
absolutist theories is appropriate at this time. CHENG, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 6, at 13–25. This R
variance of theories is evidenced by the differing approaches of the Vienna Convention on Succession of
States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts of 1983, which sets forth a slightly qualified
universal succession theory in its Article 34, and the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States § 209(2), which sets out a qualified tabula rasa theory. Because international law is by
no means settled on this issue, legal justification for the equitable mitigation of the universal succession
theory is necessary.
90. See supra Part II.
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As in the area of continuation of commercial obligations, the doctrine on
compensation for expropriation is not stable or settled.91 Two major schools
of thought exist regarding compensation for expropriation. The first, known
as the “Hull Formula,” requires states to pay “prompt, adequate and effec-
tive” compensation for lawful takings of a foreigner’s property.92 This posi-
tion is the one favored by the United States and other capital-exporting
countries, especially during the negotiation of bilateral investment trea-
ties.93 Developing countries, on the other hand, have tended to subscribe to
a compensation theory that provides that a host state should afford foreign-
ers essentially the same treatment as it gives its nationals and that compen-
sation therefore should be determined by reference to the domestic laws of
the host state.94
Additional controversy exists with respect to the appropriate compensa-
tion measure.95 This debate centers on whether compensation must be made
at market or full value, or if instead there are equity and justice considera-
tions that one “must take into account in arriving at what he may consider
as just or fair compensation.”96 Essentially, this is a conflict between the
Hull Formula, which has been interpreted as requiring full or market value
compensation, and sources that reject the Hull Formula in favor of language
that opens the possibility of equitable principles to be included in a calcula-
tion of the compensation to be paid. Examples of such sources include the
91. In fact, some have claimed that besides the law regarding the use of force, no question in interna-
tional law has given rise to as much debate. See, e.g., Rudolf Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of
Expropriation of Alien Property, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 553 (1981).
92. Press Release, S.T.E.T., Mexico: Expropriation of American Properties (Aug. 26, 1938), in DEP’T
ST. PRESS RELEASES, vol. XIX, at 139 (1939) (written by then-Secretary of State Cordell Hull about
Mexico’s expropriation of U.S. farms and agricultural properties); accord Press Release, S.T.E.T., Mexico:
Expropriation of American Properties (July 22, 1938), in DEP’T ST. PRESS RELEASES, vol. XIX, at 50
(1939); see also Dolzer, supra note 91; Oscar Schachter, Editorial Comment: Compensation for Expropriation, R
78 AM. J. INT’L L. 121 (1984). 
93. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 108 (1995).
94. This doctrine is encompassed by the U.N. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
which affirms:
[Each State has the right to] nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property,
in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures,
taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State
considers pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy,
it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless
it is freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be sought on
the basis of sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of
means.
G.A. Res. 3281, art. 2, § 2(c), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974).
95. See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 92; M.H. Mendelson, Compensation for Expropriation: The Case Law, R
79 AM. J. INT’L L. 414 (1985).
96. Bin Cheng, The Grotius Society, The Rationale of Compensation for Expropriation, 44 PROBS. OF PUB.
& PRIV. INT’L L., TRANSACTIONS FOR THE YEAR 1958–1959, at 267, 309–10 (1958). Professor Cheng’s
article is a useful source for bibliographic as well as substantive coverage of the debate concerning expro-
priation prior to the time of its publication. In particular, he makes a strong case regarding payment of
just, equitable, and fair compensation.
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Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which
calls for payment of just compensation,97 the oft-cited Permanent Court of
International Justice’s 1928 Chorzo´w case, which refers to a requirement of a
“payment of fair compensation,”98 and the 1922 Norwegian Shipowners
Claims arbitration, in which the arbitral tribunal called for “just compensa-
tion” and stated that just compensation should be determined by fair actual
value at the time and place in view of all surrounding circumstances.99
The rationale for full compensation for expropriation “consists in the fact
that certain individuals in a community . . . without their being in any way at
fault, are . . . asked to make a sacrifice of their private property for the
general welfare of the community.”100 Thus, the rationale for full compensa-
tion rests on a presumption that the private property owner and the invest-
ment itself are without fault. In expropriation cases in which the odious
finance doctrine would be relevant, the innocence of the property owner and
the investment would inherently be in question, given that the doctrine
would apply only in situations where the investor knew or should have
known that the investment would be used for purposes contrary to the pur-
poses of the nation and the investment was, in fact, used in such a way.101
Where it is established that such investors and investments do carry some
degree of fault resulting from their decision to invest despite having had
constructive or actual knowledge of the profligate purposes of their invest-
ment, considerations of equity and justice are appropriate. An odious finance
doctrine would provide a mechanism for making such considerations. In
some cases, where the benefits of the investment have accrued to the despot
and to the people, an odious finance doctrine might dictate partial, rather
than full or market value compensation.102 In the rare case where the inves-
tor is unable to show any benefit bestowed on the people by way of its
investment, expropriation with no compensation would arguably be
warranted.
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 (1987),
stating:
A state is responsible under international law for injury resulting from:
(1) a taking by the state of the property of a national of another state that
(a) is not for a public purpose, or
(b) is discriminatory, or
(c) is not accompanied by provision for just compensation (emphasis added).
98. Factory at Chorzo´w (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 46 (Sept. 13).
99. Norwegian Shipowners Claims (Nor. v. U.S.), 1 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 307, 339–41 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1922).
100. Cheng, supra note 96, at 297 (emphasis added). R
101. For further discussion of this requirement, see infra Part V.B.3.
102. For a similar proposal in the area of debt, see Ben-Shahar & Gulati, supra note 71. R
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C. Contract Law—Avoidance Doctrines
The odious finance doctrine would entail the possibility of cancelling the
contracts that establish and govern the relationship between the investor and
the state. Succession to state contracts is treated as distinct from succession
to public debt.103 The comments to § 209 of the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States state that “[w]hile terminating
an obligation to repay a debt would unjustly enrich the state, terminating
an executory contract does not necessarily have the same effect.”104 The com-
ments go on to state that the rule “corresponding to rebus sic stantibus” 105 or
to “voidability for impossibility or frustration in private contract law, might
be fairly applied here.”106
In addition to the doctrines of impossibility and frustration, the contract
doctrines of illegality and unenforceability on the grounds of public policy
may be applicable as legal bases upon which parties arguing for application
of the odious finance doctrine may rely. In this vein, readers should be re-
minded that, while many of the contracts that would come under scrutiny
under the odious finance doctrine may contain significant questions regard-
ing their legality,107 illegality is not required in order to render an agree-
ment unenforceable. Rather, a contract can be rendered unenforceable when
it is likely that refusal of enforcement will prevent the violation of suffi-
ciently important public policy. Cases regarding unenforceability for public
policy require a balancing of the interests involved, but courts have long
recognized that:
The power to contract is not unlimited. While as a general rule there is
the utmost freedom of action in this regard, some restrictions are
placed upon the right by legislation, by public policy, and by the na-
ture of things. Parties cannot make a binding contract in violation of
the law or public policy.108
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 209(2)
(1987).
104. Id. at cmt. f. Comment (f) also addresses development contract and concession agreements di-
rectly and states that it would be “unfair” to the investor to “repudiate an obligation which the private
party concluded in good faith . . . .” The odious finance doctrine does not contravene this comment, as it
would only apply when the investor knew or had reason to know of the odious character of the invest-
ment, challenging any argument that the contract was made in good faith.
105. The concept of rebus sic stantibus is stated in Restatement § 336 and comment (a) thereto and
essentially provides for the voidability of international agreements in the event of unforeseen fundamen-
tal change of circumstances.
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 209(2) cmt. f
(1987).
107. Violations of international human rights law and domestic civil rights law, domestic constitu-
tional law, international or municipal environmental law, and international or municipal corruption law
would be examples, if the party contesting the legality of the contract could show that the contract was
premised on illegal behavior (a difficult task, surely).
108. Sternamen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 62 N.E. 763, 764 (N.Y. 1902). Readers should note
that, absent explicit provisions in the contract to the contrary, cancellation of contracts will, typically, be
treated under host-country law. The discussion regarding contract law avoidance doctrine has been based
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From a normative perspective, this article is in agreement with the posi-
tion that in addition to the validly desirable policies of predictability and
stability, “international law should manage state successions to . . . facilitate
. . . and support the legitimate aspirations of territories that undergo succes-
sion.”109 Exceptions to the continuity doctrine and the inclusion of the con-
cept of odious financing in expropriation cases that align with already
existing contract avoidance doctrines may help to accomplish this policy
objective.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH-COST DEBT
Some commentators writing about odious debt have observed that the
question of whether the lender is a private firm or a public entity should not
be relevant to the consideration of what can be covered by the doctrine.110
This article accepts this proposition and adds to it the observation that sov-
ereigns seeking to raise capital have alternatives to borrowing funds. Indeed,
despots do not necessarily care about the origin of their funds—public, pri-
vate, debt, grant, contractual profit-sharing payments, taxation, or fees—so
long as they can be used to fund their corrupt, abusive, or rent-seeking
activities.111
Any number of finance methods can be used to fund undesirable activity
on the part of the despotic government. Recently, a good deal of attention
has focused on the consequences of high debt burdens for developing coun-
tries as the crushing effects of those burdens have come to be known by the
international community.112 This knowledge has resulted in the policy ini-
tiatives discussed in Part II above. To no small extent, the concern for Iraq’s
ability to emerge from the Saddam Hussein regime and the enormous debts
incurred by that regime has in part led to the recent reemergence of interest
entirely on U.S. understandings of contract law. The applicability of these avoidance doctrines would
depend on the internal law of each country asserting these bases as legal justifications for the applicability
of the odious finance doctrine.
109. CHENG, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 6; see also O’CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 14, R
at 345–52, discussing expropriation of concessions and the principles of compensation and stating:
[t]he arguments in favor of the inherent revocability of concession agreements tend to be a
fortiori in the case of successor States, which cannot be compelled to carry on with arrange-
ments made by their predecessors which are either contrary to their public interests or obstruc-
tive of the realization of their own ideas of social development.
Id. at 347–48.
110. Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, supra note 67. R
111. Bertrand Groslambert & Michel-Henry Bouchet, Do Corrupt Countries Receive Less Foreign Capital
After All? 2 (CERAM, Working Paper No.1, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=904620.
112. Debt can be extremely burdensome for developing countries and can prevent them from achiev-
ing economic growth or from pursuing economic policies and social programs that benefit their popula-
tions. See, e.g., Gerardo Esquivel, Felipe Larrain & Jeffrey D. Sachs, The External Debt Problem in Central
America: Honduras, Nicaragua, and the HIPC Initiative 1–5 (Harv. Inst. for Int’l Dev., Working Paper No.
645, 1998), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=168173 (discussing the Nicaraguan and Honduran
debt levels and their inhibiting effect on growth).
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in the odious debt doctrine.113 Again, it is not the objective of this article to
diminish or question the deleterious effects of high levels of sovereign debt.
Rather, this article aims to expand the scope of the odious debt doctrine to
other types of sovereign finance.
In part, the rationale for this expanded focus rests on the recognition of
two rationales. First, many kinds of sovereign finance ultimately rest on
contractual relationships. This rationale recognizes that the odious debt doc-
trine addresses instances of lending to despots but does not address lending
to private parties (as in the case of project finance transactions or asset-
backed loan transactions) whose activities are contracted with despots and do
not redound to the benefit of the people. The odious finance doctrine cap-
tures avenues of despotic finance that rely on contracts in the form of loan
agreements and attendant documents for memorializing terms and condi-
tions, just as it captures concession, production sharing, or project finance114
contracts for the extraction of natural resources, and contracts establishing
FDI. Second, at least some forms of sovereign finance may be at least as
harmful—or more so—to the short-term and long-term interests of the
population as debt may be. This Part will first examine two of these sover-
eign finance alternatives—natural resource extraction contracts and other
FDI.115 To the extent possible, it will also seek to provide specific examples
in which despotic regimes utilized these methods to benefit the politically
connected few rather than the population generally or, worse, harmed the
population. This Part will then suggest three types of harms not found di-
rectly in the context of debt loads but often found in natural resource explo-
ration and exploitation arrangements as well as in other types of FDI. To the
extent possible, the three categories of harms explored herein—those arising
from (1) depletion of natural resources and environmental degradation, (2)
corruption, and (3) human rights violations—will be kept conceptually sep-
arate, despite the fact that they are often intricately interconnected in the
actual circumstances in which they arise.
Readers should be alerted that it has been nearly impossible to uncover
forensic information about how despotic regimes actually finance them-
selves. As a result, this article, and particularly this Part, must on many
occasions make recourse to the information that is available about (1) cor-
ruption, (2) how natural resources contracts and other foreign investment
agreements are created and allocated, (3) protests to their creation, and (4)
113. For more on the connection between the odious debt doctrine and Iraq, see supra Part II.
114. With respect to project finance transactions, readers will note that the Equator Principles are a
voluntary code to which lenders representing a large portion of the capital for project finance transactions
have signed on. While much has been written about the Equator Principles, it is not clear how effective
they will be. It is possible that, like many voluntary codes, they will fail to be adequately monitored,
resulting in irregular compliance.
115. A notable third alternative financing source is the outright sale of land or other valuable state
assets. Sales of such property would be a natural source of funds for governments if an odious finance
doctrine failed to encompass such transactions. This section does not treat property sales at length due to
space and resource constraints. It is a subject for future research.
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the doubtful nature of their public benefit and the possibility that the pub-
lic is actually harmed by such contracts. The result is that many of the
examples provided in this article arise in countries that would likely not be
deemed despotic. The examples are meant to provide the reader with in-
sights about what occurs or is likely to occur inside despotic regimes.
A. Alternative Finance Methods
1. Natural Resource Extraction116
Concession and production-sharing contracts,117 often in conjunction with
project finance arrangements,118 can be used to arrange the financing and
extraction of a wide variety of natural resources, including oil and gas, tim-
ber, minerals, and gems. It is often by way of these mechanisms that land is
surveyed for economically profitable natural resource caches. Once the ex-
traction process has begun, these arrangements also act as the mechanisms
through which extracted, mined, or felled resources are allocated among the
116. The question of what is meant by natural resources has been a subject of some scholarly debate
and has given rise to a typology that differentiates between, for example, (1) natural resources that
require human intervention to be obtained and those that do not, (2) resources that are localized and
those that are dispersed throughout a country, and (3) those that are renewable and those that are not. For
a summary of this literature, see Matthias Basedau, Context Matters—Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-
Saharan Africa 7–8 (Global & Area Studies, Working Paper No. 1, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=906983.
117. Concession contracts are generally understood to be contracts where private ownership of the
goods to be extracted is permitted. In such a scenario, the state transfers title to these goods to the
extracting company, the company extracts the goods, and then pays a royalty and a tax on profits. This
contract system for petroleum extraction was very common until 1950. At one time, up to 122 countries
around the world were using concession contracts. Concession contracts are known for granting nearly
unrestricted and unfettered rights over long periods of time to explore and extract resources. See generally
TENGKU NATHAN MACHMUD, THE INDONESIAN PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACT: AN INVESTOR’S
PERSPECTIVE 24 (2000). Under a production sharing contract, the government owns the goods. The
extracting company and the government each have the right to sell some set percentage of the extracted
goods in accordance with the contract terms. In addition, the extracting company may be required to pay
taxes and/or royalties on their profits from the sale of the goods. For a useful roadmap of various types of
contractual arrangements for exploration and extraction of petroleum, see id. at 25; see also Wendy
Duong, Partnerships With Monarchs—Two Case Studies: Case One Partnerships With Monarchs in the Search for
Oil: Unveiling and Re-Examining the Patterns of “Third World” Economic Development in the Petroleum Sector, 25
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1171, 1211–17 (2004). For an overview of a variety of petroleum contracts, see
ZHIGUO GAO, INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CONTRACTS: CURRENT TRENDS AND NEW DIRECTIONS
(1994).
118. Project finance refers, in simple terms, to the means by which particular projects are funded and
characteristically refers to non-recourse financing which will derive its repayments from the profits of the
project itself, rather than from any particular contract party.
The term “project finance” . . . is generally used to refer to the arrangement of debt, equity,
and credit enhancement for the construction or refinancing of a particular facility in a capital-
intensive industry, in which lenders base their credit appraisals on the projected revenues from
the operation of the facility, rather than on the general assets or the corporate credit of the
promoter of the facility, and in which they rely on the assets of the facility, including the
revenue-producing contracts and cash flow, as collateral . . . .
Scott L. Hoffman, A Practical Guide to Transactional Project Finance: Basic Concepts, Risk Identification and
Contractual Considerations, 45 BUS. LAW 181, 181 n.1 (1989).
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various parties to the contract—typically the state-owner of the resources
and a private, usually foreign, corporation. Consequently, natural resource
concessions contracts or production-sharing contracts and project finance
transactions play vital roles in financing state activities.
Wendy Duong has written in great detail about a petroleum production-
sharing contract in Vietnam.119 In her study regarding the tendencies of
such arrangements to produce both monopolistic and monarchical outcomes,
she describes one Vietnamese production-sharing contract negotiated in the
early 1990s under which the extracted oil was to be shared between an inter-
national oil company and a state entity, PetroVietnam. PetroVietnam was to
receive the people’s share of the oil from the extraction activities of the oil
company.120 Under the Vietnamese Constitution, however, the people of Vi-
etnam were the collective owners of all of that country’s natural resources.121
Thus, the sale of the oil was to be made for the good of the people.122 Yet at
the time the contract was drafted and finalized, there were numerous activist
groups documenting and denouncing the government’s human rights track
record and high levels of neglect and abuse of its own people.123 The power-
ful point Duong makes is that despite such alerts and denunciations, the
production-sharing arrangement was finalized and, despite grave concern
119. Duong, supra note 117. This article does not take the position that Vietnam is ruled by a R
despotic government. On the contrary, Vietnam is an example of a country that, despite documented
problems, would be unlikely to be deemed a despotic regime such that the odious finance doctrine would
apply. Still, Duong’s work provides valuable insights into the abilities of production-sharing contracts to
consolidate power in the hands of the investor and the state. The fact that the benefits from such con-
tracts may not be passed on to the people in a country like Vietnam can be analogized to situations in
which governmental power is more consolidated and malevolent than it is in Vietnam.
120. Id. at 1195–96.
121. Id. (citing VIETNAM CONST. pmbl., art. 17). Article 17 states:
The land, forests, rivers and lakes, water supplies, wealth lying underground or coming from
the sea, the continental shelf and the air, the funds and property invested by the State in
enterprises and works in all branches and fields—the economy, culture, society, science, tech-
nology, external relations, national defence, security—and all other property determined by
law as belonging to the State, come under ownership by the entire people.
This is not an atypical arrangement. Although a survey of constitutional allocation of natural resource
ownership was not undertaken in connection with this article, similar provisions are not uncommon in
national constitutions. The Indonesian Constitution is one such example and will be discussed herein. For
the argument that the right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources has been accepted as a
principle under international law and that this is a right that rests with the people, see Emeka Duruigbo,
Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of Natural Resources in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. 33, 34 (2006). See also East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30) (adopting the
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources). See also Franz Xaver Perrez, The Relationship
Between “Permanent Sovereignty” and the Obligation Not to Cause Transboundary Environmental Damage, 26
ENVTL. L. 1193 (1996) (stating that there is a literature supporting the contention that permanent
sovereignty over natural resources has attained jus cogens status while others disagree).
122. Duong, supra note 117, at 1196. R
123. Id. at 1196–97 (citing the reports of various human rights organizations).
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that the benefit of the arrangement would not accrue to the people of Viet-
nam, there was no inquiry into the legitimacy of the deal.124
Among Duong’s hypotheses is that even contracts that are profitable for
the government may not pass any benefit on to the citizens of a country.125
This phenomenon is commonly called the resource curse126 or the paradox of
plenty127 and refers to the negative correlation between natural resource
wealth in many developing countries and their economic growth.128 This
observation has been made repeatedly and has been applied not only to eco-
nomic growth but also to the tendency of natural resource wealth to contrib-
ute to violent conflict, high levels of corruption, and other failures in
government.129
In the time since the concept of the resource curse was first identified,
other scholars have noted that a country’s governmental institutional frame-
work and the degree of corruption within a country are highly relevant fac-
tors in predicting whether natural resource extraction and production will
ultimately generate economic growth and redound to the benefit of the
country’s people.130 The claim here is not that extraction and production of
natural resources can never benefit the people of a country but that contracts
granting rights for the exploration, extraction, and sale of natural resources
in practice hold only a tenuous possibility of providing such benefits. In the
many countries in which natural resources are believed to belong, or are
legally stated to belong, collectively to the people,131 this may seem particu-
124. Id. at 1197; see also GLOBAL WITNESS, OIL AND MINING IN VIOLENT PLACES: WHY VOLUNTARY
CODES FOR COMPANIES DON’T GUARANTEE HUMAN RIGHTS (2007), available at http://www.globalwit-
ness.org/media_library_detail.php/580/en/oil_and_mining_in_violent_places.pdf.
125. Duong, supra note 117, at 1242. R
126. See RICK AUTY, SUSTAINING DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL ECONOMIES: THE RESOURCE CURSE
THESIS (1993); Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth,
(Harvard Inst. for Int’l Dev., Discussion Paper No. 517a, 1995). Sachs and Warner’s findings have been
challenged by a number of authors from a variety of perspectives. See, e.g., Matthias Basedau, supra note
116 (arguing that many factors can complicate the resource curse, such as the country’s type and degree R
of resource abundance and dependence, its resource revenue management, and the types of involved
companies); Daniel Lederman & William Maloney, Open Questions About the Link Between Natural Resources
and Economic Growth: Sachs and Warner Revisited (Banco Central de Chile, Working Paper No. 141, 2002)
(challenging Sachs and Warner’s analysis on other counts such as their study’s chosen time period and
omitted variables that could have changed their results); Osmel Manzano & Roberto Rigobon, Resource
Curse or Debt Overhang? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8390, 2001) (suggesting
that the resource curse might be better explained by focusing instead on a country’s debt burden).
127. TERRY LYNN KARL, THE PARADOX OF PLENTY: OIL BOOMS AND PETRO-STATES (1997).
128. The higher a country’s dependence on mineral extraction, as opposed to other economic activity,
the lower its standard of living will be. The relationship between dependence on oil extraction and
poverty is somewhat more ambiguous. Twelve of the world’s twenty-five most mineral-dependent states
are classified by the World Bank as “highly-indebted poor countries.” For oil-dependent states, this
number is six of twenty-five. MICHAEL ROSS, OXFAM AMERICA, EXTRACTIVE SECTORS AND THE POOR 7
(2001), available at http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/publications/research_reports/art
2635.html/OA-Extractive_Sectors_and_the_Poor.pdf.
129. See, e.g., Basedau, supra note 116. R
130. See, e.g., id.
131. Many countries grant ownership of their natural resources to the sovereign or to the people. This
is known as the domanial system. See Andrew B. Derman, International Oil and Gas Joint Ventures: A
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larly problematic. But even in countries following a domanial system, in
which natural resources are believed to belong to the state, questions must
at least be raised about the legitimacy of arrangements under which natural
resources—often the greatest source of wealth for a given country—are
promised to foreign companies, sold for profits that will benefit government
officials and foreign companies, and will not significantly benefit, or will
even harm, the people of the host country.132 Questions regarding the legiti-
macy of these contracts are especially pressing given that the natural re-
source contracts can have durations of twenty, thirty,133 or even ninety-nine
years134 and can thus result in long-term detrimental consequences to the
financial and political stability of a country135 and significantly restrict the
available sources of funds for government programs going forward.
This article proposes an odious finance doctrine that would only operate
in the event where an investment contract was incurred by a despot, did not
benefit the people, and where the investor had reason to know that the peo-
ple would not be benefited by the contract. Wendy Duong’s Vietnamese
example of what might be conceived of as a profligate investment may raise
questions about its validity and morality but it would not be treated by the
odious finance doctrine because it would fail to meet at least some of these
criteria. Nonetheless, it serves as a valuable example from which lessons can
be drawn of the connections between natural resource contracts, state power,
and wealth accumulation, and as an illustrative case of investment that has
failed to redound to the benefit of the people. Similarly, it is not the conten-
tion of this article that all situations in which the resource curse appears to
be asserting itself would give rise to the odious finance doctrine. Rather the
appearance of a resource curse within a country that is seen as despotic
might raise a rebuttable presumption that the odious finance doctrine
should apply to extraction contracts.
2. Foreign Direct Investment and Other Transactions
Contractual arrangements made between despotic governments and pri-
vate investors, public entities and/or international organizations facilitating
the exploration and exploitation of natural resources are not the only type of
Discussion with Associated Form Agreements, 16 A.B.A. SECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 62 (1992).
132. Within the odious debt doctrine discourse, an argument has been made that debt might only be
reduced to the extent it did not benefit the people of a country. See Ben-Shahar & Gulati, supra note 71. R
133. MACHMUD, supra note 117. R
134. For example, Liberia granted Firestone a ninety-nine year concession to vast tracts of land for the
purposes of latex harvesting in 1926. For more on this arrangement, see infra Part IV.B.3.c.ii.
135. A recent example arises in Guatemala where a concession granted by a military dictatorship to a
mining company in the 1960s continues to be the source of land conflict and potential human rights
violations. To the current knowledge of this author, the facts of this situation have not been the subject
of scholarly exposition or coverage by the mainstream media. They have thus not yet been verified but
have been the source of activist alerts. See, e.g., RightsAction, Skye Evictions (Aug. 1, 2007), http://
www.rightsaction.org/urgent_com/Skye_evictions_080107.html.
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potentially odious non-debt obligation a new government may face. FDI in
other economic sectors serves as one category of example, as may outright
sales of valuable government property.136
FDI has been defined as an “investment made to acquire lasting interest
in enterprises operating outside of the economy of the investor” and in-
cludes gaining an effective managerial voice for the investor as among its
objectives.137 This is almost always accomplished by way of an equity invest-
ment in a given enterprise.138 Three main FDI strategies are greenfield in-
vestments, mergers and acquisitions, and joint ventures139 and the
distinguishing characteristic of FDI is often stated to be “control over the
assets of a foreign enterprise.”140 As of 1995, FDI was the “largest single
source of external finance for developing countries.”141
Countries eager to attract FDI must make decisions regarding two types
of legal rules. First, they must address questions regarding registration re-
quirements and restrictions on FDI. For example, a country must determine
if it intends to restrict investment active in particular sectors or engaged in
particular activities, such as investments that might invoke national security
concerns.142 In addition, national policymakers must make decisions regard-
ing a wide range of regulations with respect to labor, environmental, corpo-
rate, tax, and intellectual property law, and regarding how foreign
companies will be treated with regard to ownership requirements, licenses,
export and transfer of profits, and investment incentive programs.143 While
countries are increasingly settling these issues by way of bilateral investment
treaties (BITs),144 the ability of each country to make decisions regarding
those aspects of its regulation that can attract foreign investment ought not
136. See supra note 115. R
137. UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?int
ItemID=3146&lang (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). There are many valid definitions for FDI. The WTO
Secretariat, for example, states that FDI “occurs when an investor based in one country (the home coun-
try) acquires an asset in another country (the host country) with the intent to manage that asset. The manage-
ment dimension is what distinguishes FDI from portfolio investment in foreign stocks, bonds and other
financial assets.” WTO Secretariat, Trade and Foreign Investment, PRESS/57 (Oct. 9, 1996), reprinted in
LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 3 (Daniel D. Bradlow & Alfred Escher eds., 1999).
138. LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 137. R
139. Id. at 20.
140. Id. at 20–21. See also MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOR-
EIGN INVESTMENT 4–8 (1994).
141. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES xi (1995).
142. Countries are given wide prerogative to make determinations of this sort, as they “have the right
to freely regulate the entry of foreigners into their economies unless they have provided otherwise in an
international agreement.” LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 137, at 29. R
143. Id. at 29.
144. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are:
[A]greements between two countries for the reciprocal encouragement, promotion and protec-
tion of investments in each other’s territories by companies based in either country. Treaties
typically cover the following areas: scope and definition of investment, admission and estab-
lishment, national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment,
compensation in the event of expropriation or damage to the investment, guarantees of free
transfers of funds, and dispute settlement mechanisms, both state-state and investor-state.
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to be underestimated. For example, BITs do not typically address specific
labor practices or environmental laws and licenses, which may be of great
importance to investors in particular business sectors.
FDI scholars have noted that the most attractive quality of any host coun-
try in attracting FDI is a “clear, transparent, stable and enforceable legal
framework.”145 This article by definition addresses itself to those situations
in which the legal environment does not meet these criteria, but to which
FDI is nonetheless attracted. In these environments, other qualities must be
used to attract FDI. It may be worth conjecturing whether these are the
locations in which light environmental standards, low wages, minimal labor
protections, and tax holidays are most prevalent.
Indeed, if stable, clear, and transparent legal frameworks are not available,
or if political stability and security are not present, arrangements may be
made (contractually or less formally) to provide the foreign investor with the
security it requires.146 These arrangements can and have come at great cost
to the populations surrounding FDI enterprises. The recent lawsuit against
Chiquita Brands International, in which Chiquita pled guilty to charges of
paying bribes to the Colombian paramilitary group, AUC, and the recently
discovered connections between the Colombian government and the AUC
serves as an insight into these types of arrangements.147
The Chiquita example, like other examples of corporate misbehavior, of-
fers insight into these potential long-term, contractually imposed harms to
the public good and to the welfare of a population. Again, it is not the claim
of this article that Colombia should be viewed as a despotic regime. Rather,
Colombia is an open enough country that we are able to obtain current
information regarding profligate practices on Chiquita’s part. The Chiquita/
Colombia example is offered not as an instance in which the odious finance
doctrine would operate, but rather as an example of the type of arrange-
UNCTAD, Investment Instruments Online: What are BITs?, http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/
Page____1006.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). There are now over 2000 BITs, involving more than
175 countries. UNCTAD, Investment Instruments Online: UNCTAD Analysis of BITs, http://
www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page____1007.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
145. LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 137, at 28. R
146. The recent report by Global Witness cites to a number of such arrangements. See GLOBAL WIT-
NESS, supra note 124. The report also discusses the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights R
which aim to address this issue through a voluntary code of conduct with only opaque enforcement
mechanisms. See id. at 9–15.
147. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Chiquita Brands International Pleads Guilty to Making
Payments to a Designated Terrorist Organization and Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine (Mar. 19, 2007),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/March/07_nsd_161.html; see also The National Security
Archive, Documents Implicate Colombian Government in Chiquita Terror Scandal: Company’s Military
Payoffs Made Through Military’s ‘Convivir’ (Mar. 29, 2007), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB217/index.htm; Michael Evans, ‘Para-Politics’ Goes Bananas, NATION, Apr. 16, 2007, http://
www.thenation.com/doc/20070416/evans. The AUC has a long history as a documented violator of
human rights. See The National Security Archive, Paramilitaries as Proxies: Declassified Evidence on the
Colombian Army’s Anti-Guerilla “Allies” (Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB166/index.htm.
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ments that one would find if it were possible to unveil all arrangements
made between investors and despotic regimes.
In addition, as in the discussion of natural resource extraction arrange-
ments, it is clear that FDI itself should not be seen as odious, nor should all
FDI within despotic regimes be characterized in this light; these strokes
would obviously be grossly over-broad. Rather, arrangements for the estab-
lishment of a foreign direct investment within a particular country should
not enjoy protection from scrutiny simply because the obligations they cre-
ate on the part of the government are contractual obligations to do some-
thing other than pay interest and principal on a loan.
B. Instances in Which the Alternatives Have Been More Harmful than
Debt Alone
1. Depletion of Natural Resources and Environmental Degradation—The
Indonesian Example
Examples of massive environmental degradation facilitated or performed
by foreign companies may result in short-term, medium-term, and/or long-
term harms. For the purposes of this article, short-term harms may be
thought of as those harms that have negatively affected the population dur-
ing the time the despotic regime was in power. Medium-term harms are
both those harms that will impinge on the abilities of the successor govern-
ment to attract new investors in its early years as well as those harms that
will thus prevent the successor government and population from making use
of existing environmental and natural resources for their own benefit. Long-
term harms are those that prevent successor governments and populations
from ever recovering the value of depleted environmental and natural re-
sources. Each will be discussed in turn.
Short-term environmental harms are essentially those harms that were in-
curred and experienced by the population during the time the despot was in
power. Harmful air and water pollution are good examples.148 As a general
matter, nondemocratic governments and dictatorships have been found to
provide public goods, including safe water and pollution control, at signifi-
cantly lower levels than democratic governments.149 Specific historical in-
148. Some categories of environmental harms may last long into the future. In this event, it will be
useful to think of these as short-term as well as medium- or long-term harms.
149. Robert Deacon, Dictatorship, Democracy, and the Provision of Public Goods 28, 39–44 (Dep’t of
Econ., U.C. Santa Barbara, Departmental Working Papers, Paper 20-03, 2003), available at http://reposi-
tories.cdlib.org/ucsbecon/dwp/20-03; Roger D. Congleton, Political Institutions and Pollution Control, 74
REV. ECON. & STAT. 412 (1992) (arguing that political arrangements (i.e. democratic vs. authoritarian)
have more impact on environmental regulation than other factors); see also Eric Neumayer, Do Democracies
Exhibit Stronger International Environmental Commitment? A Cross-Country Analysis, 39 J. PEACE RES. 139,
140, 144 (2002) (establishing a “positive impact of democracy on international environmental commit-
ment” but also challenging the proposition that democracy and poor environmental outcomes are
strongly correlated, except where there is little time lapse between policy adoption mirroring commit-
ment and environmental outcome). For an empirical analysis that suggests a multidimensional relation-
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stances of harmful air and water pollution are also available.150 At the end of
the Cold War, the environmental abuses of Eastern Europe’s totalitarian so-
cieties created a set of data points confirming the proposition that such re-
gimes are less prone to provide necessary environmental regulation.151 And
today in China, for example, over 750,000 people are believed to die prema-
turely each year from exposure to pollutants, including approximately
350,000 to 400,000 premature deaths annually due to poor air quality in
Chinese cities.152
Some commentators have argued that the assumption that totalitarian re-
gimes will always be less protective of the environment than democratic
governments does not withstand empirical analysis.153 Whether totalitarian
regimes provide more or less environmental protections than democratic
ones, however, is not the only issue in relation to odious investment; in fact,
it is not particularly relevant. More germane is whether the population in
question derived enough benefit from the pollution-generating investment
activity. This article assumes that industrial activity will produce pollution
and environmental harm.154 This pollution may be thought of as the nega-
tive consequence of economic growth.155 However, in democratic societies,
the assumption is that the people will benefit from the economic upsides of
the industrial activity. A common problem in totalitarian regimes, on the
other hand, is the highly stratified distribution of wealth, which restricts the
distribution of benefits beyond elite sectors of society. To the extent that the
population incurred the cost of industrial activity and was harmed by its
pollution and did not benefit from that activity, the investment should be
thought of as contrary to the interests of the population.
Among the medium-term consequences emerging governments will face
is the inability to attract new income-producing investors to locations that
are significantly polluted, unhealthy, and afford only a low quality of life.156
Added to this medium-term consequence is the inability of successor gov-
ernments to make new and more equitable arrangements for the exploration
and extraction of the country’s natural resources. Until semi-renewable re-
sources have been restored, they cannot be used responsibly by future gov-
ship between democracy and environmental outcomes, see Manus I. Midlarsky, Democracy and the
Environment: An Empirical Assessment, 35 J. PEACE RES. 341 (1998).
150. It is not always easy to obtain information regarding air and water quality of a location ruled by
a despot. For this reason, it is of course worth noting that historical experience may not be relevant to
modern-day or future dictatorships. However, given the findings discussed above regarding the tendency
of dictatorships to provide lower levels of pollution control, historical instances may be useful in thinking
through the potential for environmental harms in current and future dictatorships.
151. Midlarsky, supra note 149. R
152. Richard McGregor, 750,000 a Year Killed by Chinese Pollution, FIN. TIMES, July 2, 2007, available
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/8f40e248-28c7-11dc-af78-000b5df10621.html.
153. Midlarsky, supra note 149. R
154. Congleton, supra note 149. R
155. Id.
156. In addition to making a location unappealing to potential investors, whole economic sectors,
such as tourism, may be unavailable until air and water pollution are alleviated.
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ernments hoping to pass the benefits of such use on to the countries’
populations.157
The long-term environmental and resource depletion harms that can be
caused by foreign direct investment are not necessarily particular to despotic
regimes. In every instance in which resources are used at a rate faster than
they can be restored, natural resources are depleted, often forever. All styles
of government, democratic and not, participate in this type of long-term
natural resource depletion.158 Some may argue that extraction of natural re-
sources is not necessarily a public harm. It can have beneficial economic
effects without consequentially harming the environment, and there are am-
ple examples of this type of sustainable extraction.159
The likelihood of extraction being sustainable, however, is far more likely
when the enterprise is controlled by an entity whose interests include look-
ing after the long-term welfare of its people and the environmental well-
being of the territory it controls. Particular to despotic regimes, for example,
are the uses of those resources and the income stream they produce. Defores-
tation in Indonesia during the years of Suharto’s rule serves as one telling
example.160
Article 33 of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution states in paragraph 3 that
“[t]he land, the waters and the natural riches contained therein shall be
controlled by the State and exploited to the greatest benefit of the peo-
ple.”161 Nonetheless, during Suharto’s rule, Indonesia witnessed far-reaching
deforestation and forest degradation that operated in the context of wide-
scale corruption and violated the constitutional mandate of providing maxi-
mum benefit for the people:162
Deforestation in Indonesia is largely the result of a corrupt political
and economic system that regarded natural resources, especially forests,
as a source of revenue to be exploited for political ends and personal
157. An elaboration of renewable, semi-renewable, and nonrenewable resources is beyond the scope of
this article. For the sake of simplicity, it adopts a framework in which renewable resources are those that
can be replaced at the same rate as human consumption of that resource (such as wind or solar power);
semi-renewable resources are those that, with proper management, can be used in perpetuity (such as
sustainable deforestation or other types of soil-intensive farming or well-planned use of aquifers); and
nonrenewable resources are those that cannot be replaced at the rate of human consumption (such as oil
and gas, but would also include excessive use of otherwise semi-renewable resources that have been
depleted beyond their ability to self-renew).
158. Midlarsky, supra note 149, at 351–53. R
159. ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS, supra note 16. R
160. Suharto was Indonesia’s second president. Under his rule from 1967–98, Suharto’s “New Order”
authoritarian government was militaristic, violent toward dissident sectors of his own population, and
corrupt. See, e.g., AUDREY R. KAHIN & GEORGE MCT. KAHIN, SUBVERSION AS FOREIGN POLICY: THE
SECRET EISENHOWER AND DULLES DEBACLE IN INDONESIA (1995); Army in Jakarta Imposes a Ban on
Communists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1965, at 1.
161. 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, art. 33.
162. See generally THE STATE OF THE FOREST: INDONESIA (Emily Matthews ed., 2002).
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gain . . . and their profitability was used by the Suharto regime as a
means to reward and control friends, family, and potential allies.163
In 1967, Indonesia’s Forestry Act created the option for the granting of
timber harvesting rights and logging concessions. As a result, exports of
Indonesian timber rose rapidly in the 1970s.164 Nearing the end of Suharto’s
rule, “some 585 concessions covered 63 million [hectares], approximately
one-third of the nation’s total land area.”165 Logging concessions in Indone-
sia were for terms of up to twenty years166 and initially named private enti-
ties as the concession holders.167 As a result of these contracts, the long-term
well-being of the forests suffered significantly.
The close connection between the Suharto regime and most of the major
timber groups resulted in a lack of oversight and transparency, which is one
reason for ongoing poor forestry management.168 In early 2000, the Ministry
of Forestry reported that “most” of the forests under logging concessions
were in a “damaged condition.”169 Restrictions and rules on logging, which
make up part of the concession contracts, were regularly violated by timber
companies.170 Despite the large-scale depletion of one of Indonesia’s key nat-
ural resources in a manner that did not benefit the people, Suharto and the
private enterprises benefited significantly. During his rule, Suharto is be-
lieved to have stolen between $400 million171 and $35 billion.172
The example of Indonesia during Suharto’s rule is one example of two
combined phenomena. The first, called the “pollution haven” hypothesis,
theorizes that firms will flock to areas with lower environmental protec-
tions.173 This hypothesis is shown to be particularly strong in the case of
firms engaged in pollution-intensive activities.174 The second theory, also
supported by empirical data, is that the ability of FDI to influence govern-
163. Id. at 23.
164. Id. at 24.
165. Id. at 26.
166. Id. at 24.
167. After initial concession periods ended, a large number of concessions “either transferred to five
state-owned corporations . . . or reconstituted as joint ventures between private firms and one of the state
firms.” Id. at 26. Others directly benefited Indonesia’s military who became concession holders of 1.8
million hectares. However, private corporations continued to benefit significantly. Even after “this major
shake-up in the industry, the top 10 timber companies were virtually unscathed; their ranking and
control over concession area changed little.” Id. at 27.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. WORLD BANK, INDONESIA: ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN A
TIME OF TRANSITION 19 (2001), available at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/eap/eap.nsf/Attachments/
Indonesia+Environmental+Report/$File/Indonesia+ENVNRM+Transition-entire.pdf.
171. Peter Gelling, Indonesia: Suharto Is Sued Over State Money, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2007; see also Peter
Gelling, Indonesia: Charges Dropped Against Ailing Suharto, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2006.
172. Suharto Tops List of Embezzling Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2004.
173. Beata Smarzynska Javorcik & Shang-Jin Wei, Pollution Havens and Foreign Direct Investment: Dirty
Secret or Popular Myth?, 12 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2673, 2001), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=328240.
174. Id.
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mental policy makers to ease environmental restrictions is conditional on the
local government’s degree of corruptibility.175 The evidence supporting this
theory, combined with the pollution haven hypothesis, suggests that FDI
pursued in the context of a corrupt government may lower local environ-
mental standards which in turn may have the effect of attracting pollution-
intensive industry. Adding to this already bleak situation, corrupt govern-
ments are far less likely to pass the benefits of FDI to their populations, and
the means by which benefits are retained in the hands of the elite may not
be explicit or transparent, since corruption and non-contractual arrange-
ments benefiting the government or the investor in illicit ways will likely
always be obscured. As a result, the long-term obligations under contracts
with foreign investors for natural resource extraction or other FDI activity
may rely on assumed or implicit terms that are highly undesirable to the
new government and not beneficial to the populations thereof.
2. Widespread Corruption176
Corruption is not explicitly stated as a requirement for loan forgiveness
under the odious debt doctrine. However, the doctrine assumes at least some
level of corruption, as it requires that loans forgiven thereunder have been
extended to a government but have not been used for the benefit of the
population.177
Three theoretical relationships between FDI and corruption are identified
here. The first has already been mentioned above and lies in the capacity of
foreign firms to influence corrupt governments to adopt regulatory policies
that are beneficial to their operations.178 The second relationship has been
referred to as the “helping hand” of corruption.179 In this relationship, cor-
ruption greases the wheels of investment, production, and commerce.180 The
third relationship has been identified as the “grabbing hand” of corruption
175. Matthew A. Cole, Robert J.R. Elliott & Per G. Fredriksson, Endogenous Pollution Havens: Does
FDI Influence Environmental Regulations? (Univ. of Nottingham, Research Paper No. 20, 2004), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=764124.
176. This article adopts the definition of corruption employed by Transparency International, a
leading anti-corruption organization: “Corruption is operationally defined as the misuse of entrusted
power for private gain.” Transparency International Website, Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
177. See Gray, supra note 74. R
178. See Cole et al., supra note 175. R
179. See Peter Egger & Hannes Winner, How Corruption Influences Foreign Direct Investment: A Panel
Data Study, 54 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 459 (2006). The “helping hand” view of corruption is
similar to the “efficient grease” hypothesis, which supposes that corruption can help to attract foreign
direct investment by minimizing tax burdens. See Shang-Jin Wei, Does Corruption Relieve Foreign Investors
of the Burden of Taxes and Capital Controls? (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2209,
1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=623966; Shang-Jin Wei, Corruption in Economic Development:
Beneficial Grease, Minor Annoyance, or Major Obstacle? (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No.
2048, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=604923.
180. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q. J. OF ECON. 599, 600 (1993); see
generally Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Allocation of Talent: Implications for
Growth, 106 Q. J. OF ECON. 503, 503–30 (1991).
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and suggests that corruption is costly for investors.181 While one or more of
these relationships might be beneficial to the income stream of a corrupt
government, none are beneficial to the population. For this reason, this arti-
cle contemplates short- and long-term effects of FDI under corrupt and des-
potic governments.
This article maintains that the “helping hand” of corruption, while it
may exist, is not beneficial enough to provide economic progress. Rather, it
accepts the conclusion that “the benefits of corruption are not apparent even
where they are most confidently expected. . . . [C]orruption appears not to
be beneficial for economic development, nor is it indispensable as a tool of
political integration.”182
As in the discussion of environmental harms and natural resource degra-
dation, short-term, medium-term, and long-term harms result from FDI
under corrupt governments. The short-term harms are those that occur
while a despotic government remains in power. In the context of corruption,
short-term harms would essentially fall into two categories. The first would
consist mainly of the lost economic benefit the population would have de-
rived from natural resource exploitation and other forms of FDI had the
despotic government officials not taken the proceeds for their own personal
use. The second cost consists of the difference between the value of natural
resource extraction or concession contracts entered into at market price and
those entered into because the winning bidder paid the most bribes or kick-
backs. This cost also includes the cost associated with the possible ineffi-
ciency, environmental degradation and labor abuses in which the winning
bidder may engage. Presumably, under a non-corrupt regime, factors such as
the value of the bids and the quality of the bidder’s environmental and labor
practices would enter into the decision of which firm should be awarded the
contract. In an environment of corruption, these considerations are much
less important.183 To the extent that this occurs and prohibits more efficient
and beneficial activity, the population will have incurred harm.
An excellent example of this type of harm is the Kenyan Anglo-Leasing
Scandal, in which a French firm originally bid on a government contract for
a new passport printing system at a rate of C=6 million. The contract was
awarded to a British firm, Anglo-Leasing and Finance, at a rate of over C=30
million. Anglo-Leasing then arranged to subcontract the work to the same
181. See Egger & Winner, supra note 179, at 459–60. R
182. M. Shahid Alam, Anatomy of Corruption, 48 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 441, 453 (1989). But see David
H. Bayley, The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation, 19 W. POL. Q., 719, 732 (1966) (stating that
corruption may be vital to development in that “corruption may play a useful role which is sufficiently
important that if it was not played by this device must be played by another or the consequences might
severely undermine the pace, but more importantly the character, of the development effort”).
183. Augustine Ruzindana, The Importance of Leadership in Fighting Corruption in Uganda, in INST. FOR
INT’L ECON., CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 133, 137 (Kimberly Ann Elliot ed., 1997)
(stating that corruption often results in abandoned or incomplete roads, buildings and other projects that
are the physical manifestation of corruption opportunities).
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French firm.184 This scandal was just one of many of its sort, which has led
to a strong perception that Kenya is among the most corrupt countries in
the world.185
The longer-term detrimental effects of corruption come over time and,
again, are of two sorts.186 The first is “the fact that when corruption be-
comes endemic, it can threaten the basic rule of law, property rights, and
enforcement of contracts.”187
Data from a number of developing countries shows that endemic corrup-
tion of this sort is particularly damaging to the poor because of pervasive
corruption in basic services.188 Indicative of this phenomenon is Save the
Children’s work promoting revenue transparency in the extractive oil and
gas sector. Their work highlights the negative impacts of corruption and a
lack of transparency on the provision of public services such as healthcare
and education, which disproportionately affect children, and especially poor
children.189
In addition, the degradation of the legitimacy of a government and its
legal system can have long-term effects on the level of investment a country
is able to attract over time.190 This reputational harm is difficult to measure
but also difficult to repair.191
Illustrative of the potential magnitude of these harms, a study addressing
the effects of bureaucratic inefficiency (a milder problem) on yearly GDP
concluded that:
[I]f Bangladesh were to improve the integrity and efficiency of its bu-
reaucracy to the level of that of Uruguay (corresponding to a one-stan-
dard deviation increase in the bureaucratic efficiency index), its
184. See Jeevan Vasegar, Kenyan President Faces Rebellion on Sleeze, GUARDIAN, Feb. 24, 2005; see also
Report from John Githongo, Permanent Secretary for Governance and Ethics at the time of the scandal,
to Mwai Kibaki, Kenyan President (summary of report) (Nov. 22, 2005), available at http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/09_02_06_kenya_report.pdf.
185. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 63 (ranking Kenya 150 out of 180 countries for its high
level of corruption).
186. Experts on corruption have identified four types of harm: political, economic, social, and envi-
ronmental. For a discussion of each of these, see Transparency International Website, supra note 176.
187. Omar Azfar, Young Lee & Anand Swamy, The Causes and Consequences of Corruption, 573 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 46 (2001).
188. See id. at 48.
189. See SAVE THE CHILDREN, BEYOND THE RHETORIC: MEASURING REVENUE TRANSPARENCY: COM-
PANY PERFORMANCE IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRIES i (2005), available at http://info.worldbank.org/
etools/docs/library/238453/Comp.pdf (stating that “[c]hildren are the most vulnerable to the devastating
impact of conflict and chronic under-investment in health and education.”); see also id. at 1 (providing
more detailed information regarding the impact of a lack of transparency on children).
190. See Azfar et al., supra note 187 at 53; see also Alam, supra note 182, at 453; Egger & Winner, R
supra note 179, at 460. R
191. In this way, the harm to a country’s reputation with respect to its level of corruption is similar to
a company’s goodwill, which refers to the intangible assets of a corporation, including customer relations,
brand name, and good employee relations. For more on valuing goodwill and on the legal history of the
concept of goodwill, see generally Gabriel A. D. Preinreich, The Law of Goodwill, 11 ACCT. REV. 317,
317–29 (1936).
\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-1\HLI103.txt unknown Seq: 37 26-DEC-07 12:44
2008 / From Odious Debt to Odious Finance 145
investment rate would rise by almost five percentage points, and its
yearly GDP growth rate would rise by over half a percentage point.192
The view that a country’s perceived levels of corruption—or its reputa-
tion with respect to corruption—is detrimental to its future ability to at-
tract FDI is reinforced by the above quotation and is adopted and perhaps
perpetuated by Transparency International, a leading anti-corruption NGO.
Because corruption operates for the most part in secret, actual levels of cor-
ruption are difficult to determine. For this reason, Transparency Interna-
tional publishes annual Corruption Perception Indexes which are composite
indexes that draw on multiple expert opinion surveys polling perceptions of
public sector corruption in 163 countries around the world. The Corruption
Perception Index “scores countries on a scale from zero to ten, with zero
indicating high levels of perceived corruption and ten indicating low levels
of perceived corruption.”193 Because information regarding secretive transac-
tions is inherently imperfect, there is likely to be a significant time lag
between efforts to expunge corrupt activity from the private and public sec-
tor and improvements in the perceived level of corruption within a given
country.194
3. Human Rights Abuses
The moral imperatives of the odious debt doctrine are strengthened by
the possibility that the loans provided to a despotic leader not only failed to
benefit the population but were in fact used to finance the harms inflicted
by the despot upon the population. This article agrees that the notion of
192. Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q. J. ECON. 681, 705 (1995).
193. Press Release, Transparency International, Persistent Corruption in Low-Income Countries Re-
quires Global Action (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_re-
leases/2007/2007_09_26_cpi_2007_en; see also TRANSPARENCY INT’L, Corruption Perceptions Index
2006 (Sept. 24, 2007), http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007. Trans-
parency International has also recently begun publishing a Bribe Payers Index, looks at supply-side
corruption in terms of the perceived propensity of companies from thirty leading exporting countries to
pay bribes overseas. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, BRIBE PAYERS INDEX (May 8, 2007), http://www.
transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/bpi.
194. There are currently strong proposals on the table for improving transparency and reducing cor-
ruption, especially in resource-rich nations. See, e.g., Publish What you Pay, http://www.publishwhatyou
pay.org (last visited Nov. 10, 2007); The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, http://www.
eitransparency.org (last visited Nov. 10, 2007); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of International Information
Programs, G8 Summit Advances Anti-Corruption Efforts Worldwide (June 10, 2004), http://usinfo.
state.gov/ei/Archive/2004/Jun/10-83709.html (discussing the 2002 G-8 Evian Declaration); Trans-
parency International, Business Principles for Combating Bribery, http://www.transparency.org/global_
priorities/private_sector/business_principles (last visited Nov. 10, 2007); Transparency International,
Promoting Revenue Transparency Project (June 11, 2006), http://www.transparency.org/publications/
newsletter/2006/july_2006/anti_corruption_work/revenue_transparency; OECD, Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions (Nov. 21, 1997), http://
www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2017813_1_1_1_1,00.html. The OECD Conven-
tion was inspired by the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–3 (2006) and
the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-3 (2006), which
implemented the OECD convention in U.S. law.
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holding the population of a newly democratized state responsible for the
repayment of loans that were used to abuse them is abhorrent. In addition,
other types of investments, such as extractive industry investments and
other types of FDI, sometimes play direct, facilitative, or complicit roles in
human rights violations.195 To the extent that this can be shown to have
occurred, such FDI should not enjoy the benefits of the standard continuity
of commercial obligations doctrine or of full or market value compensation
for expropriation.
In recent years, the connections between transnational corporations and
human rights violations have received significant attention,196 and examples
of human rights violations caused by corporations or in which they were
complicit are relatively numerous.197 Each instance in which a particular
investor has directly or indirectly engaged in human rights violations will
have particular facts that will have to be established before any doctrine
negating the continuity of the investment could be of use. For this reason, it
is beyond the scope of this article to detail all the various types of human
rights abuses that might create a basis for negation of the continuity doc-
trine and/or the doctrine regarding compensation for expropriation. What
follows are just a handful of a large number of cases in which FDI caused
harms that might have been avoided or mitigated had an odious finance
doctrine been included in the risk calculations of the investing firms.
a. Angola: Diamond and Oil Extraction and Human Rights
The diamond extraction industry has received much attention over the
past decade, as larger and larger portions of the diamond-demanding popu-
lation have come to learn of the importance of diamonds in financing inter-
nal wars in locations such as Angola and Sierra Leone and of the brutal labor
practices surrounding their extraction in such situations.198
In Angola, the rebel group UNITA had a long-standing strategy of occu-
pying the areas with the highest concentration of diamond mines and used
diamonds to finance the purchase of weaponry.199 During, and as a result of,
195. See, e.g., GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 124. R
196. For a broad overview of the many industries, countries, international interventions, legal
frameworks, and possible violations, see Business and Human Rights Resource Center, http://
www.business-humanrights.org/Search/Sitemap (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). For a somewhat dated,
though excellent overview of the human rights obligations of corporations, see Steven R. Ratner, Corpora-
tions and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 466–67 (2001).
197. To date, there are no agreed standards for establishing complicity by corporations in human
rights violations. See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES, SUMMARY
(2002), available at http://www.ichrp.org/paper_files/107_p_02.pdf (examples of complicity include situ-
ations in which corporations benefit from human rights abuses and/or situations in which corporations
are silent in the face of human rights abuses committed by others).
198. See G.A. Res. 55/56, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/56 (Jan. 29, 2001).
199. Massimo Guidolin & Eliana La Ferrara, Diamonds Are Forever, Wars Are Not. Is Conflict Bad for
Private Firms? 3 (Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis, Research Div., Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2005-
004C, 2006), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2005/2005-004.pdf. From the time Angola
\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-1\HLI103.txt unknown Seq: 39 26-DEC-07 12:44
2008 / From Odious Debt to Odious Finance 147
Angola’s civil war, thousands of civilians were killed, hundreds of thousands
were maimed and millions were displaced.200 UNITA’s attacks against civil-
ians, including mass murders of civilians, have been documented.201
Beginning in 1994, as part of a peace agreement, UNITA was formally
permitted to mine diamonds and was also permitted to form partnerships
with foreign companies.202 The importance of diamonds to UNITA and of
UNITA-controlled diamonds to the diamond market as a whole was signifi-
cant. It is estimated that from 1992 to 1997, “the rebel movement supplied
between eight and ten percent by value of the rough diamonds on the world
market.”203 The connections between UNITA and foreign diamond compa-
nies during this period have been established elsewhere and include recorded
connections between twelve transnational diamond buying companies and
UNITA.204
A possibly related fact lies in the days immediately after the death of
UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi. Savimbi’s death led to the precipitous end of
Angola’s civil war. Rather than resulting in a gain in stock prices for
“Angolan” diamond stocks, Savimbi’s death caused an immediate, abnormal
decline of four percent in the stock price of companies holding diamond
concessions in Angola.205 The cease-fire process that resulted from Savimbi’s
death led to further declines of up to nine percent, leading commentators to
conclude that the “unambiguous end of the war was still bad news for dia-
mond mining companies working in Angola.”206 In other words, “investors
perceived Savimbi’s death as ‘bad news’ for the companies holding mining
concessions in Angola, and as ‘no news’ or ‘good news’ for otherwise similar
companies not operating in the country.”207
UNITA was not the only party engaging in human rights abuses during
Angola’s internal war, nor were diamonds the only source of funds for the
rebels or the government.208 In addition to receiving income from diamond
operations, the government of Angola and its military were also financed by
gained independence until 2002, UNITA (Unia˜o Nacional para a Independeˆncia Total de Angola) fought
the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Liberac¸a˜o de Angola). On February 22, 2002, UNITA leader Jonas
Savimbi was killed and within two months of his death a ceasefire agreement was signed. Id.
200. Chairman of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions Against UNITA, Supplementary Report of
the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA, ¶ 5, delivered to the Security Council and the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/2001/966 (Oct. 12, 2001) (prepared by Richard Ryan), available at http://
www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/Angola/966e.pdf [hereinafter Report of the Monitoring Mechanism].
201. Id. at 6.
202. Guidolin & La Ferrara, supra note 199, at 3. R
203. Id. (citing TONY HODGES, ANGOLA: ANATOMY OF AN OIL STATE, 174–77 (2000)).
204. Report of the Monitoring Mechanism, supra note 200, ¶ 205. R
205. Guidolin & La Ferrara, supra note 199, at 5. R
206. Id. at 13.
207. Id. at 8.
208. See Phillipe Le Billon, Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 100 AFR.
AFF. 55, 55–80 (2001) (stating that international corporations were intricately connected to both the
military strategy of the government and the strategy of rebellion).
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oil extraction209 and human rights reports document abuses perpetrated by
government entities against civilian populations, primarily in oil rich re-
gions of the country.210 In addition, it is estimated that from 1997 to 2002,
more than $4 billion of oil revenue was embezzled from the government
coffers, contributing to wide-scale childhood malnutrition, and undermin-
ing the civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights of Angola’s
citizens.211
b. Myanmar: “[N]otorious for using violence and coercion to secure areas
slated for major investment projects”212
The ruling government of Myanmar (formerly Burma), like Angola, is
highly dependent on oil and natural gas extraction to sustain its military
rule. It is estimated that Myanmar’s gas industry accounted for at least
thirty percent of the country’s exports.213 The connection between human
rights abuses and investments in this sector of the Burmese economy has
received much attention, in part due to a lawsuit based on the U.S. Alien
Tort Statute (“ATS”).214
The Doe v. Unocal lawsuit involved the construction of a natural gas pipe-
line in Myanmar. The plaintiffs, Burmese villagers, sued Unocal, alleging its
complicity in violations committed by the Burmese military, intelligence,
and police forces. These violations included violence and intimidation to
relocate whole villages, enslave villagers living in the pipeline area, steal
property, require forced labor, and commit assault, rape, torture, and mur-
der.215 The lawsuit was ultimately settled out of court,216 but not before
media attention was drawn to the regular violations of human rights within
Myanmar in connection with large scale investments such as the Unocal
pipeline.
As new deposits of natural gas are discovered in western Myanmar, firms
from India, South Korea, Russia, and China have been undeterred by the
expense and public embarrassment Unocal experienced as a result of its con-
nections with the Burmese military.217 For example, the Shwe gas field is
being developed by a group of South Korean and Indian firms in partnership
209. Guidolin & La Ferrara supra note 199, at 5. R
210. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Angola: In Oil Rich Cabinda, Army Abuses Civilians
(Dec. 23, 2004), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/12/23/angola9922.htm.
211. Id.
212. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Burma: Natural Gas Project Threatens Human Rights:
South Korean, Indian Investments May Lead to Complicity in Abuses, (March 24, 2007) [hereinafter,
Human Rights Watch, Burma], available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/03/24/burma15557_
txt.htm.
213. Id.
214. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C § 1350 (2006).
215. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
216. EarthRights International was the representative for the plaintiffs in the case. See EarthRights
International, Doe v. Unocal, http://www.earthrights.org/legal/unocal (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
217. For a valuable probe into the issue of Chinese investment and its effects on human rights obser-
vance by private actors, see Patrick Keenan, Financial Globalization and Human Rights, 45 COLUM. J.
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with the government.218 Analysts estimate that the Shwe field could result
in revenues of $580–$824 million per year for twenty years, for a total of
$12–$17 billion.219 These investments are being made in the face of high
levels of well-known human rights abuses by the Burmese military,220 and
in the face of knowledge that the Burmese government “spends the bulk of
Myanmar’s resources to maintain its enormous army, and has some of the
lowest social spending of any country in the world.”221
It is important to note that while the practices in Myanmar may be par-
ticularly egregious, connections between natural resource extraction by for-
eign corporations and human rights abuses have been drawn in many other
areas of the world.222 Lawsuits against Shell for its activities in Nigeria223
and against Texaco for its activities in Ecuador224 provide just two examples.
c. Historical Labor Abuses on Banana Plantations and Child Labor in
Liberia
i. Latin American Banana Plantations
Historical accounts and analysis of the relationship between the United
Fruit Company and dictatorships in Latin America during the twentieth
century provide another example of what has been termed the potential
“Triple Alliance” that may be formed between investors engaged in FDI,
repressive governments, and the elite of the investor’s host country.225 Dur-
ing the early part of the twentieth century, United Fruit received a number
of land grants and railway concessions from dictatorial governments.226 Dur-
ing this same time period, dictatorial governments were often willing to
TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 3–5, on file with author); see also Human Rights
Watch, Burma, supra note 212. R
218. Id. Human Rights Watch also reports that:
The Shwe gas project is led by the South Korean company Daewoo International. The com-
pany’s former president and chief executive, Lee Tae-yong, went on trial in Seoul this month
on charges that he and executives of six other companies illegally exported weapons equipment
and technology that was used to build an arms factory in central Burma.
Id.
219. Id.
220. See BBC News, Red Cross Condemns Burma ‘Abuses’, June 29, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
asia-pacific/6252024.stm. The International Committee of the Red Cross closed some of its offices in
Myanmar in October 2006, and in June 2007, in a rare departure from its usually neutral stance on
conflicts and human rights abuses, denounced the excessive human rights abuses by the Burmese
military.
221. Human Rights Watch, Burma, supra note 212. R
222. See, e.g., GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 124.
223. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 104–05 (2d Cir. 2000) (alleging complicity
in human rights abuses against the Ogoni People and Wiwa in particular).
224. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (alleging violations of human
rights due to significant environmental harm caused by Texaco’s negligence in its operations in Ecuador).
225. Marcelo Bucheli, Good Dictator, Bad Dictator: United Fruit Company and Economic Nationalism in
Central America in the Twentieth Century 7 (Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign, C. of Bus. Working Papers
Series, Paper No. 06-0122, 2006), available at http://www.business.uiuc.edu/Working_Papers/papers/06-
0115.pdf.
226. Id. at 12, 14, 16.
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violently suppress labor unrest for the benefit of United Fruit.227 In addi-
tion, it has been argued that the relationship between United Fruit (and
other foreign investors) and repressive governments is, by necessity, a rather
close one.228 The relationship allows the firm and the government to benefit
each other while the people gain little and may actually be harmed as a
result of the arrangement.229
ii. Firestone in Liberia
A second example comes from Liberia, spanning 1926 to the present. The
recent Roe v. Bridgestone230 ATS case provides a concise history of how the
labor abuses and slave-like conditions in Liberia worsened significantly after
the establishment of Bridgestone Firestone’s rubber-tapping operations
there in 1926.231
At that time, then Liberian president Charles D. B. King’s government
granted Firestone a ninety-nine year concession for the right to lease one
million acres of land suitable for latex harvesting. In 1927, King’s govern-
ment was accused of recruiting and selling forced labor for various infra-
structure projects and selling people into slavery.232 The resulting inquiry
into Liberian labor conditions included, among other negative findings, the
conclusion that high government officials
have given their sanction for compulsory recruitment of labor for road
construction, for shipment abroad and other work, by the aid and assis-
tance of the Liberian Frontier Force; and have condoned the utilization
of this force for purposes of physical compulsion on road construction
for the intimidation of villagers, for the humiliation and degradation of
chiefs, of captured natives to the coast, there guarding them till the
time of shipment.233
The lead investigator for the League of Nations into the labor situation in
Liberia concluded that human beings were being pawned by the govern-
ment.234 Firestone, however, did not leave the country, nor did it ensure that
227. Id. at 3, 5.
228. Id. at 8.
229. For example, when banana prices fell in Honduras in 1932, United Fruit lowered wages of
workers and local planters. As a result, workers went on strike. The Honduran dictator of the moment,
Gen. Tiburcio Carı´as, allowed the wage reduction and reacted to the worker strikes by banning the
communist party, prosecuting the opposition and creating an even closer bond with United Fruit. Id. at
13.
230. Roe v. Bridgestone, 492 F. Supp. 2d 988 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
231. See also Phillip James Johnson, Seasons in Hell: Charles S. Johnson and the 1930 Liberian Labor
Crisis (Mar. 31, 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University) (on file with the
university library), available at http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-04152004-123145.
232. See U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
INTO THE EXISTENCE OF SLAVERY AND FORCED LABOR IN THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA (1931).
233. Id.
234. Cuthbert Christy, Pawning of Human Beings in Liberia, 30 J. ROYAL AFR. SOC’Y 113, 169–74
(1931).
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Firestone would forego all benefits from this type of human exploitation.
Indeed, the plaintiff’s complaint in the Firestone case alleges that soon after
Bridgestone Firestone was granted its concession,
indigenous people were forced from their land and were then con-
scripted to provide forced labor, first planting and cultivating rubber
trees and then harvesting latex from the mature trees. The Complaint
alleges that Firestone agreed to pay local chiefs to deliver able-bodied
workers to the Plantation, and that the local chiefs conscripted workers
at gunpoint. According to the Complaint, plaintiffs and most other
current workers on the Plantation are third or fourth generation de-
scendants of those original workers, and these plaintiffs have rarely if
ever left the Plantation.235
The complaint in this case also alleges that conditions for adults and chil-
dren continue to be excessively exploitative.236 It is significant, however,
that the plaintiffs feel themselves at liberty to sue Firestone under the
ATS.237 This is an encouraging sign that the emerging democracy in that
country may be creating an atmosphere for redressing and correcting the
exploitative practices of previous Liberian regimes.
Considering the grim nature of available information regarding labor
abuses in relatively open societies,238 there is real cause for concern regarding
the labor practices of firms operating within closed societies in the control of
despotic governments.
To the extent that firms are benefiting from the ability of a regime to
offer its labor force at excessively low rates and/or with little or no regula-
tory protections, firms may be engaging in investment activity that benefits
the repressive regime but may not benefit the people of their host country.
Indications of this sort of activity would be most obvious when governments
supply armed security forces, military forces, or police to ensure through
violent means that labor unrest is suppressed.
235. Entry on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 11, Roe v. Bridgestone, 492 F.Supp. 2d 988 (S.D.
Ind. 2007) (No. 06-0627).
236. See id. at 12–13 (noting that the complaint alleges that the Firestone plant was created in close
collaboration with the Charles Taylor regime to allow human exploitation and has continued in this vein.
It also notes that the complaint alleges that during the Taylor regime, Firestone “used its shipping
facilities to import arms and ammunition” for the military).
237. See id. (refusing to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims regarding the exploitation of child labor by
Firestone).
238. Examples include India, Ecuador, Mexico, Guatemala, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates.
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V. AN ODIOUS FINANCE DOCTRINE
A. Characteristics That Make Debt Odious and Not Just Onerous
The odious debt doctrine discourse often arises in the context of countries
with extremely high levels of debt. Many countries have high levels of debt,
and some of that debt may be forgiven under various efforts already dis-
cussed herein. It is important to recall, however, that the odious debt doc-
trine is not primarily a tool for the reduction of debt that could
appropriately be thought of “merely” as excessive, burdensome, and diffi-
cult or impossible to service. Rather, the odious debt doctrine targets a more
narrowly defined and particular type of debt. The task now at hand is to
examine what makes a particular debt odious as distinguished from debt
that is “only” onerous. By exploring these elements, a clearer perspective
should be obtained on the applicability of the concept of odiousness to other
types of despotic finance.
As stated previously, the agreed-upon characteristics making debt odious
under the odious debt doctrine are (1) that it was incurred by a despotic
power,239 (2) that it was used for purposes that do not further the interests of
the state, and (3) that the creditor must have known that the loans would be
used for purposes that were contrary to the interests of the nation.240
Finally, some have argued that, in addition, the debt must have been
incurred without the consent of the people. Clearly, then, not all burden-
some debt can be called odious as most debt will not fit even the three
standard criteria of the odious debt doctrine.
B. Can Only Debt Be Odious?
The essential question for the purposes of this article is whether there is
any underlying reason why the concept of odiousness has thus far been re-
stricted to the realm of credit financing and has not yet made the leap to
other sources of financing.
In considering the types of investments discussed herein—investments
involving outright sales and purchases and FDI in various sectors—the aim
has been to provide information about the potential negative outcomes of
such methods of despotic financing. The goal has not been to give a bal-
anced account of the outcomes of all instances of such sales and FDI. Rather,
the article by necessity has focused on the most egregious type of such activ-
ities, operating in locations that have the worst governments. When these
investments finance despotic governments, they might justify exceptions to
the doctrine of continuity of commercial obligations, and argue in favor of
239. SACK, supra note 19, at 157–84. R
240. Id.
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equity concerns in the context of compensation for expropriation in the
event of government succession.
Before reaching the conclusion that they would, in fact, justify mitigating
these doctrines, however, it is worthwhile to elaborate on the analogies be-
tween the loans that would be treated under the odious debt doctrine and
the investments that have been discussed herein. What follows is a rephras-
ing of the characteristics of odious debt to encompass other types of despotic
financing explored in this article.
1. Incurred by a Despotic Power
Despots regularly create national obligations. In the case of outright sales
of state property, the government will have created an obligation either ex-
plicitly or implicitly to not retake the property in the future without com-
pensation.241 In many cases, the government will have entered into bilateral
investment treaties, which bind it to provide favorable investment terms
and operating environments for foreign investors. In the case of oil, gas, gem
and timber extraction, land concessions, production-sharing agreements, and
project finance, the underlying contract will likely create an additional set of
obligations on the part of the government, including the granting of prop-
erty, the provision of security, and the promise of tax holidays. Many of
these obligations may be long-term, and are likely to outlive the reign of the
despots who create them.
2. Used for Purposes That Do Not Further the Need or Interests of the State
As has been demonstrated herein, there is significant debate regarding the
extent to which direct investors benefit from associations with despotic re-
gimes. Some argue that democratic regimes are more beneficial environ-
ments for transnational firms. It must be said that much FDI may benefit
the interests of the state (meaning the people of the state), whether through
the payment of taxes, the provision of employment opportunities, or the
transfer of technology to host country enterprises. But, as has been shown
herein, there are also instances in which the overwhelming effect of an inves-
tor’s operations does not further the interests of the state, but rather prima-
rily benefits the personal interests of those comprising the despotic
incumbent government.242
In many cases, the investor’s operations will diminish the natural resource
wealth of a country such that the people and successive governments will
have far fewer available sources of funds, especially if their obligations are
241. In some cases, the government may have signed a bilateral treaty stating explicitly that it em-
ploys a compensation standard that mirrors the Hull formula (discussed previously in Part III). This
article takes the position that such provisions to bilateral treaties should be cancelled in cases where the
elements of an odious finance doctrine are satisfied.
242. See discussion of Angolan diamond operations and discussion of corruption, supra Part IV.B.3.a.
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continued.243 In some cases, high levels of corruption result in very little or
no revenues from an investment being used for the provision of even essen-
tial public services.244 It is difficult to contemplate how it could be argued
that such investments redound to the benefit of the people.
Further, in some cases, the presence of an investor will destabilize a re-
gion, and in order to aid an investor’s activities, a government may displace
whole villages, enslave people, and engage in arbitrary detention, killings,
and other human rights violations. Such government activity may be fi-
nanced directly or indirectly though government payments, or by the firm
itself.245 In other cases, an investor’s allegiance with the government results
in labor regulations and policies that violate basic labor rights principles.246
In such cases, again, convincing arguments that an investor’s presence bene-
fits the people would be difficult to construct in earnest.
3. The Investor Must Know That the Investment Would Be Used for
Purposes Contrary to the Interests of the Nation
The increasing flow and availability of information regarding corruption
perceptions, human rights abuses, and political conditions make accurate
risk assessments in relation to these factors easier for investors than they
previously have been. Nonetheless, any requirement of “knowledge” on the
part of the investor gives rise to a number of questions that have arisen in
the context of the odious debt discussion247 as well as in the context of anti-
corruption efforts.248
Robert Howse has provided a discussion of the proper knowledge stan-
dard within the odious debt doctrine literature.249 A complete analysis and
recommendation of the standard of knowledge250 in the context of invest-
ments of the sort described by this article must be reserved for another day
or another author. However, since outright sales and FDI (especially FDI in
243. See discussion of environmental degradation and natural resource exploration and extraction,
supra Part IV.B.3.
244. See discussion of Myanmar, supra Part IV.B.3.b.
245. See discussion of Myanmar and gas exploration, supra Part IV.B.3.b.
246. See discussion of the United Fruit Company in Latin America and latex in Liberia, supra Part
IV.B.3.c.
247. See Chander, supra note 42. R
248. See, e.g., Julia Christine Bliss & Gregory J. Spak, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1988: Clarifi-
cation or Evisceration?, 20 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 441 (1989) (discussing the 1988 amendments to the
FCPA, which included a more stringent knowledge requirement by deleting a controversial “reason to
know” standard).
249. Howse, supra note 34, at 20–21. R
250. The definition of and required standard of knowledge is a source of controversy both in the
odious debt doctrine and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act contexts. Knowledge might mean actual knowl-
edge (i.e., the firm actually knew that its investment in a host state would be detrimental to the interests
of the nation) or it might mean constructive knowledge (i.e., the firm knew, had reason to know, or should
have known that its investment would be detrimental to the interests of the nation). Because actual
knowledge is much more difficult to establish than constructive knowledge, the standard chosen is quite
important.
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the extractive and agricultural sectors) are significantly more vulnerable to
internal political conditions and volatility251 than other credit-only invest-
ments, the standard required to trigger the odious finance doctrine need be
no stricter than the knowledge standard required to trigger the odious debt
doctrine.
4. Incurred Without the Consent of the People
As was stated in the earlier discussion of the characteristics of the odious
debt doctrine, there is some controversy over this criterion.252 This author
adopts the view expressed by Buchheit, Gulati, and Thompson regarding
this criterion because she finds it redundant with other characteristics of
odious debt.253 If the obligations were incurred by a despot, they were likely
incurred without the consent of the people.
The analysis contained in this Part leads to the conclusion that the charac-
teristics that make debt odious under the odious debt doctrine can be rather
easily applied conceptually to the obligations taken on by despots in connec-
tion with other types of financing. These obligations can also be deemed
odious and, as a result, under the doctrine of odious finance, such obliga-
tions should be forgiven, cancelled, or deemed void. The moral imperatives
of the odious debt doctrine presumably would also transplant onto non-debt
obligations. This being the case, a significant concern arises. This concern is
the impetus of this article and is discussed in subpart five below.
5. Why an Odious Finance Doctrine?
Loans are not the only sources of funds for despots. In many instances,
loans may not even be the most lucrative source of funds. A functional odi-
ous debt doctrine would only deter potential creditors from lending to des-
pots but would leave other sources of financing available. Some of those
sources, as has been shown herein, may be more detrimental to the popula-
tion than onerous debt levels. Indeed, a functional odious debt doctrine,
without more, might create incentives to further pursue these more damag-
ing alternative methods of raising funds. The blind spots of the odious debt
doctrine and its attendant literature lie in the unintended consequences that
will arise if debt remains the only method of despotic financing treated by
the concept of odiousness.
This possibility requires broader thinking about odiousness, such that the
concept might attach itself to a much larger set of obligations incurred by a
despotic power that are not used to further the interests of the population of
the state and that the investor must have known would be used for purposes
251. See, e.g., Le Billon, supra note 208, at 561. R
252. See supra note 42 (“Buchheit, Gulati, and Thompson, for example, fold the fourth criterion into R
the requirement that a despot incur the debt. For them, this implies that the people did not approve the
incurrence of the debt.”); Buchheit, supra note 7, at 1213 n.29.
253. Buchheit, supra note 7, at 1213 n.29.
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contrary to the interests of the nation. Under an odious finance doctrine, any
such obligation would be treated as an exception or a mitigating factor to
standard law dictating continuity of obligations in government successions
and requiring compensation for expropriations and would be subject to full
or partial cancellation.
VI. PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF AN ODIOUS FINANCE DOCTRINE
A. Natural Limits
Among the primary justifications for the doctrine of continuity of com-
mercial obligations in international law is that any alternate rule would cre-
ate instability and would lead to significantly less business activity due to
the unpredictability of outcomes in the event of government succession. The
viability of the world economic system simply depends on this sort of pre-
dictability and stability. Similar theories underlie arguments for full com-
pensation for expropriation.
As has been shown above, however, some economic activity may not be
beneficial, benevolent, or even neutral in relation to the welfare of the people
in the countries in which they operate. Investors who have engaged in in-
vestments creating obligations that satisfy the criterion of an odious finance
doctrine have engaged in activity that ought not to be protected. Rather, they
have engaged in activity (corruption, human rights abuses, etc.) that ought
to be deterred. A doctrine that would create additional risk and instability
for this type of investment is likely to result in at least two likely outcomes.
In some cases, investors may decide that the risk and instability created by
the doctrine deters their investment altogether. The reaction of some readers
to the possibility of complete divestment may initially be negative. How-
ever, readers should bear in mind that any investor making an assessment
that its activities may someday fall under the ambit of the odious finance
doctrine is likely engaging in highly undesirable activity. Divestment may
be a good outcome in these cases.254
Another likely outcome is that investors will be more scrupulous about
their own actions and more scrutinizing and demanding about the actions of
their governmental contracting partners. In the context of the odious debt
doctrine, commentators have noted that the detailed terms and conditions of
some loans regarding the uses of the loan proceeds and reporting require-
ments of the debtor may come to be more explicit and demanding so that
254. Fidelity Investments provides a recent example of this type of divestment; as a result of pressure
created by a divestment campaign, the company has reduced its holdings in oil companies with ties to
Sudan. Indiana University Human Resource Services, The Informed Employee, Fidelity Reduces Its Holding
in Companies with Ties to Sudan, No. 41 at 3 (August 2007), available at http://www.indiana.edu/~uhrs/
benefits/bulletin/2007/Aug/3.html#sudan. Similarly, Warren Buffett has recently sold $100 million
worth of shares in PetroChina. See Divesting PetroChina, FIN. TIMES, October 10, 2007, at 14, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/1/1aef9f02-7646-11dc-ad83-0000779fd2ac.html.
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the lender is able to ensure that their loans are not used for abhorrent ends
and will thus not become subject to the odious debt doctrine. Bilateral trea-
ties and contracts could contain similar terms and conditions.
In addition, when this occurs as a result of arrangements agreed upon
with a despotic government and only the despotic government has bene-
fited, upholding such obligations after the government has been succeeded
may contribute to continued corruption, environmental harm, human rights
abuses, and political and economic instability within the state of the newly
formed government. This seems contrary to the policy objectives of predict-
ability and stability over the long term.
Other authors have noted that in some cases, countries have made the
informed decision to service debt obligations that might have been classifia-
ble as odious. The primary reason for an emerging government to continue
servicing all loans is to demonstrate its goodwill and sense of responsibility
toward the international community and to gain the respect and goodwill of
the international community and potential future investors.255
In the case of FDI, successor governments may have additional reasons not
to upset particular investors as well as the international community. To the
extent that the terms and conditions contained within the four corners of the
contracts between the despotic government and the investor are not them-
selves objectionable (and indeed they may not be, as the undesirable activity
of such investors and governments may not be set out in a legal document),
the emerging government may find it beneficial to their ongoing need for
investment and state financing to maintain the investment within their ter-
ritory. However, in the instances where this is not the case, the odious fi-
nance doctrine would function to provide emerging governments with a tool
to terminate or modify those obligations created by the despot that were not
in the ongoing interest of the state and the people to maintain. The odious
finance doctrine would reset the presumption of continuity of commercial
obligations, and it would factor into determinations of just or equitable
compensation for expropriation upon succession. It would provide this func-
tion in relation to the very worst investment activities operating in countries
that had the very worst governments.
B. Obligation Cancellation256
There are at least three possible scenarios for obligation cancellation under
an odious finance doctrine. The first would only require an assessment of the
odiousness of the particular regime; the second would require consideration
of the beneficence of each contract as a whole made under a despotic regime
and a determination; and the third would require consideration of each term
255. Robert Howse has made note of this phenomenon. See Howse, supra note 34, at 23. R
256. This would include the cancellation of the legal obligation to compensate for expropriations and
the cancellation of state contracts.
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of each contract that has come to be questioned under the odious finance
doctrine.
The first possibility would not determine whether particular contracts are
odious, but rather whether particular regimes are odious. Proposals have
been made in the context of discussions of the odious debt doctrine that an
efficient (though highly political) method of providing creditors with infor-
mation about whether loans to a particular government may be cancelled
under the odious debt doctrine is to establish an institutional body charged
with the task of declaring governments odious.257 Such declarations would
provide creditors with somewhat reliable knowledge, information and pre-
dictability ex ante that any loans made to that government may not be repaid
if a new government should topple the incumbent despot.258 With that in-
formation, creditors could both determine whether or not to extend loans to
a despotic regime at all and, if they were tentatively willing to extend the
loan, calculate what interest rate would be high enough to compensate itself
for the added attendant risk.
The second possibility assumes that even despotic regimes may make con-
tracts that are good for their populations and attempts not to deter that
activity. Under this possibility, no official ex ante determination of the odi-
ousness of a given regime would be made. Rather, each investor would be on
notice that the odious finance doctrine may operate to cancel particular con-
tracts that a succeeding government claims meet the requirements of the
odious finance doctrine. Such determinations would be made on an invest-
ment-by-investment or contract-by-contract basis, and only those contracts
fitting the odious finance doctrine would be cancelled, voided, or declared
unenforceable.
The third possibility appreciates that emerging governments may want to
maintain economic programs that include active FDI in many sectors and
may wish to continue many of the contracts and concessions made under the
despotic government. It is possible, nonetheless, that the successor govern-
ment may determine that some of the terms of established contracts or con-
cessions go to the heart of the contract’s odiousness. This approach would
maintain whole contracts, which would be enforceable if “odious terms” in
the contract were renegotiated or removed such that the whole contract
would be beneficial to the population.
Each of the possibilities detailed above would have its particular adminis-
trative costs. One can imagine that a system that entailed wholesale procla-
mations of regimes as odious would carry with it front-end costs of political
negotiations and confrontations in the time leading up to such a proclama-
tion, given that odiousness would, in many cases, result in broad divestment
from countries with odious governments. On the other hand, the last two
257. This possibility has been discussed by Howse and others. See, e.g., Howse, supra note 34, at 23. R
258. Some readers may consider such a body to be analogous to commercial rating agencies.
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possibilities would carry with them back-end costs as any disputes over the
odiousness of a contract would likely be litigated or arbitrated in lengthy
proceedings. Investors whose contracts were named as wholly or partially
odious (as well as their home governments) would engage in long-term liti-
gation and arbitration to defend their interests, much as investors and their
governments have done in the past when contracts and investments have
fallen into dispute.
Currently, such litigation and arbitration includes as its legal backdrop
doctrines that favor continuity of commercial obligations and full compensa-
tion for expropriation. An odious finance doctrine would provide emerging
governments saddled with “odious obligations”259 with tools for resetting
the presumption of continuity and full compensation by providing excep-
tions and mitigating factors to these doctrines when justice so requires. The
arbitration setting may be particularly well suited to this type of equity
consideration, given the variety of legal and non-legal sources and considera-
tions an arbitral tribunal may employ in arriving at its decisions.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE AMBITS OF ODIOUSNESS
As has been stated previously, the aim of this article has not been to
dilute or derail the potential utility or impact of the odious debt doctrine.
That doctrine is founded on strong legal and moral principles that should be
given full consideration. This article has addressed the potential implica-
tions of a functional odious debt doctrine acting in isolation from larger
considerations of the various funding sources for despots. In the event that
lenders believe their loans may not be repaid due to the odious debt doc-
trine, they will chose either to only extend loans with very high interest
rates and stringent repayment terms or will decide that even high interest
rates cannot cover their risk and will not provide loans at all. Despots faced
with little or no possibility of accessing low cost loans or any loans at all to
fund their personal operations are not likely to throw up their hands and
give up power. Rather, they will turn to other possible sources to finance
their regime. As this article has demonstrated, these alternative sources may
often result in more long-term damage to the people and the territory of a
country than debt.
This article, therefore, urges broad thinking about the ambits of odious-
ness such that all sources of funds for despotic governments are subject to
review and, where justice requires, are subject to cancellation due to their
odious nature. Any other approach will create incentives that may result in
broader, more prolonged and more unfortunate harms than debt alone can
inflict.
259. O’Connell used the term “odious obligations.” See O’CONNELL, LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION, supra
note 14, at 421. R
